R.C.W., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A minor was adjudged delinquent for trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance after being found in a shopping mall parking lot in violation of a trespass warning. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the state need only prove four elements and that the parking lot qualifies as property other than a structure or conveyance.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state was not required to prove that appellant defied an order to leave, and was not required to demonstrate that the mall itself was property other than a structure or conveyance. It was sufficient that the state proved the four statutory elements, and the parking lot qualifies as property other than a structure or conveyance.
[1] To establish a violation of Florida Statute section 810.09, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully entered property, that the propert…
[2] A conviction for trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance does not require proof that the defendant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to be found guilty of the crime of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, in the context of this case the state was required to prove, in essence, the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant willfully entered the property alleged; (2) the property was owned by or lawfully in possession of the person alleged; (3) notice not to enter had been given by actual communication to the defendant; and (4) that defendant's entering the property was without permission.”
Establishes the four-element test for conviction under section 810.09 for trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a child with several misdemeanor shoplifting referrals, received a written trespass warning in December 1985 prohibiting him from entering …
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant appeals an order adjudging him delinquent on the grounds that he trespassed on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm.
Appellant, who had several misdemeanor referrals for shoplifting, was given a written trespass warning in December 1985, and told not to come back to the Governor’s Square Mall, the parking lot of the mall, or the wooded area to the north of the mall. He was given another trespass warning on May 26, 1986. The next day, mall security personnel spotted him in the mall, the police were called, and he was arrested for trespass.1 He was charged and found guilty of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985). He appeals, contending that the state did not prove a violation of that statute in that it failed to prove the mall was “property other than a structure or conveyance,” or that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or authorized person.
In order to be found guilty of the crime of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, in the context of this case the state was required to prove, in essence, the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant willfully entered the property alleged; (2) the property was owned by or lawfully in possession of the person alleged; (3) notice not to enter had been given by actual communication to the defendant; and (4) that defendant’s entering the property was without permission. See Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal), “Trespass — On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance.” The state is not required to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or authorized person in order to establish a violation of section 810.09. See also, Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla.1979); Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1976); and State v. Yunker, 402 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Neither was it necessary for the state to demonstrate that the mall was property other than a structure or conveyance. The state submitted evidence that appellant was warned not to come back to the parking lot of the mall, which is property other than a structure or conveyance. We agree with the state that it is reasonable to infer that appellant trespassed upon the parking lot in gaining entrance to the mall and thus his conviction of trespass upon property other than a structure or conveyance should stand.
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. . Because appellant had been given a trespass warning the day before he was arrested, we do not consider whether the trespass warning given in December 1985 was "stale.”
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Citator
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State v. McCORMACK, 517 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…at the defendant willfully entered the property; (3) that the defendant was on the property without authorization, license, or invitation; and (4) that notice not to enter had been given to the defendant by actual communication. See R.C.W. v. State, 507 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). When an arrest is made without a warrant, it must be based on probable cause that an offense has been committed. D’Agostino v. State, 310 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla.1975). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known t…
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Smith v. State, 778 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…d the police not to “hang out” in front of the store); Melton v. State, 546 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (explaining that bar manager had banned the customer from the premises and told the police he was having a problem with him); R.C.W. v. State, 507 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (commenting that the defendant, who was arrested for trespassing in a mall parking lot had been given a written trespass warning not to come back to the mall). Posting is a valid device for preventing the uninvited from trespass…
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L.D.L. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…he property was owned by or lawfully in possession of the person alleged; (3) notice not to enter had been given by actual communication to the defendant; and (4) that defendant’s entering the property was without permission. See R.C.W. v. State, 507 So. 2d 700, 701-702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) “Trespass — On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance.” The State did not prove each element of the offense of trespass — violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Stat…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979)
- Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Yunker, 402 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)