ARTHUR ARGERENON AND BARBARA ARGERENON, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
ST. ANDREWS COVE I CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., A FLORIDA NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of a condominium association in a mold and mildew damage suit brought by unit owners who had previously been members of a class action against the developer. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment and that res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines did not bar the individual claim.
The court held that summary judgment was premature because material facts remained in dispute regarding whether the individual claim was previously decided in the class action. The statute of limitations did not bar the suit as damages recurred within the statutory period. Res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable because the real parties in interest were not in an adversarial relationship in the prior class action; they were aligned on the same side.
[1] Summary judgment is premature when material facts remain in dispute regarding whether individual claims for damages were previously litigated and decided.
[2] Res judicata requires identity of causes of action and identical real parties in interest for it to bar a subsequent suit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for estoppel by judgment to be a bar to a subsequent suit, the causes of action in the two suits must be different and the real parties in interest must be identical to both suits.”
Establishes the legal standard for when estoppel by judgment can bar a subsequent action
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Arthur and Barbara Argerenon owned a unit in St. Andrews Cove I Condominium and suffered mold and mildew damage in the interior of their un…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant/appellee St. Andrews Cove I Condominium Association, Inc., plaintiffs/appellants argue that their instant suit is not foreclosed by either the statute of limitations, res judicata (or estoppel by judgment), or collateral estoppel based on their membership in the class of a prior successful class action against the developer of the condominium in which they live. We agree. Because we find that appellants have demonstrated that there are material facts still in dispute regarding whether their individual claim for damages from mold and mildew in the interior of their condominium unit were previously proven and judgment awarded thereon, we find that summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings is premature.
Furthermore, reliance on res judi-cata, or estoppel by judgment as argued in the alternative, must be grounded on identity of several particulars, some of which are not identical in the instant ease. Specifically, for estoppel by judgment to be a bar to a subsequent suit, the causes of action in the two suits must be different and the real parties in interest must be identical to both suits. See Krug v. Meros, 468 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1295 (Fla.1985), and cases cited therein. Sufficient inquiry must also be made, inquiry which has not yet been made in the instant case, as to which precise facts or questions were distinctly put in issue and were actually determined by the former judgment. Krug, 468 So. 2d at 302. Appellants must be provided an opportunity to present their individual case, not common to the previous class action in an effort to fix liability for their damages. Naturally, appellees will have their own opportunity to defend by showing that these facts were indeed fully presented and decided in the former judgment in favor of a finding of no liability on the part of the association.
Although we have difficulty in distinguishing the alleged separate causes of action in the two suits under scrutiny here, it is clear that the real parties in interest, the individual unit owners (appellants) and the association were aligned on the same side of the case in the previous class action but are adversaries for the first time in the instant case. Unless they were in such an adversarial position to fully litigate the issue between them to a full conclusion, the outcome of the earlier litigation could have no effect in the subsequent case to provide a bar on the ground of collateral estoppel. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 413 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
We hold specifically that the statute of limitations is not a ground upon which a summary judgment could have been based as the damages have recurred within the statutory time limit. Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs, 473 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). As indicated above, collateral estoppel could not support the summary judgment either. The grounds of res judi-cata or estoppel by judgment have not yet been fully explored. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANAHY, C.J., and RYDER and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur.
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Shayan Keramati v. Schackow, 553 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…nconstitutional, unfortunately for the Roberts and the Keramatis, only prospectively. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla.1980). . Market v. Dizney, 534 So. 2d 1205 (Flaz.5th DCA 1988); Argerenon v. St. Andrews Cove I Condominium Ass'n., Inc., 507 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Hittel v. Rosenhagen, 492 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Barnett Bank of Miami v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); 32 Fla.Jur.2d Judgments and Decrees § 147 at 546. . Zeidwig holds mutuality of part…
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Munsey v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Fla., 538 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…54 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977). Although Munsey has contended that collateral estoppel is inappropriate in the face of different causes of action, that argument is groundless. As was stated in Argerenon v. St. Andrews Cove I Condominium Ass’n., Inc., 507 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), “for estop-pel by judgment to be a bar to a subsequent suit, the causes of action in the two suits must be different and the real parties in interest must be identical to both suits.” Our independent review of the record in…
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Krug v. Meros, 468 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Kulpinski v. City OF Tarpon Springs, 473 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 413 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)