DAVID L. HAUCKE, APPELLANT,
v.
OXFORD DEVELOPMENT AND HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The court held that a workers' compensation order awarding attorney fees based on the statutory sliding fee schedule is not defective for failing to make specific findings on prescribed factors when counsel waives expert testimony and presents no argument on the factors.
Appellant challenged a workers' compensation order awarding attorney fees under the statutory sliding fee schedule, arguing it lacked findings of ulti…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from a workers’ compensation order in which attorney fees were awarded appellant’s counsel in the amount prescribed by the sliding fee schedule contained in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. Appellant challenges the order as defective, contending that proper findings of ultimate fact are not set forth. More specifically, appellant contends that the deputy commissioner’s order must state that he considered all the relevant, prescribed factors in determining the appropriate fee.
The deputy awarded the amount due under the sliding fee schedule contained in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, and stated in his order that he “[saw] no reason to depart from the statutory guideline.” Counsel had waived expert testimony and stipulated that the hearing on attorney fees be based on affidavits. Moreover, counsel presented no facts or argument relative to the prescribed factors.
Under these circumstances, the deputy’s order is not defective. Accordingly, we affirm the deputy’s order. BOOTH, C.J., and JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
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Fumigation Dep't & Claims Ctr. v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…urly rate. The deputy’s order does not adequately address the other criteria described in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. While a fee order may not always need to expressly address every one of these criteria, cf., Haucke v. Oxford Development, 507 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the order should generally reflect the deputy’s consideration of these factors, and must indicate the basis for a fee award which departs from the statutory percentage formula. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So.…
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Tenneco, Inc. v. Giese, 544 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…urly rate. The deputy’s order does not adequately address the other criteria described in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. While a fee order may not always need to expressly address every one of these criteria, cf., Haucke v. Oxford Development, 507 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the order should generally reflect the deputy’s consideration of these factors, and must indicate the basis for a fee award which departs from the statutory percentage formula. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So.…
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ARI Mut. Ins. Co. v. Llaguno, 920 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Haucke v. Oxford Dev., 507 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).…