M.V., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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M.V., a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for sexual battery, appealed his conviction and community control sentence. The court upheld the speedy trial extension based on the victim's unexpected refusal to testify but remanded for correction of the sentence to include a specified duration for community control.
The trial court properly granted the speedy trial extension because a child victim's sudden reluctance to testify, despite prior willingness, constitutes an unforeseeable and unexpected circumstance justifying an extension under juvenile procedure rules. However, the sentence was improper because community control must have a specified duration not exceeding either the maximum sentence for the offense or the juvenile's nineteenth birthday.
[1] A trial court may grant an extension of speedy trial time based on exceptional circumstances, including the unexpected incapacity or unforeseeable absence of a uniquely n…
[2] A child victim's reluctance to testify in a sexual battery case, occurring shortly before trial, can constitute an unexpected and unforeseeable circumstance warranting a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One of the exceptional circumstances specifically listed is 'unexpected illness or unexpected incapacity or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial.'”
Establishes the legal standard for exceptional circumstances under Rule 8.180 that permits speedy trial extensions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.V. was adjudicated delinquent and placed on community control. The state requested a speedy trial extension six days before the October 28, 1985 dea…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, M.V., was adjudicated delinquent and was placed on community control.
On appeal, he contends first that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The state requested and obtained an extension of speedy trial on the grounds that the victim of the sexual battery had become uncooperative and the state wished to use the new hearsay exception under section 90.803, Florida Statutes (1985).
Appellant’s speedy trial time was to run out on October 28, 1985. On October 22, 1985, the prosecutor requested an extension on the grounds that its four-year-old victim had recently become uncooperative and would not testify. Under the new statute, however, the state was required to give defense counsel ten days notice. The state could not comply. The court found the witness problem to be an exceptional circumstance and granted the extension over appellant’s objections.
Under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.180, the trial court may grant such an extension on the grounds of exceptional circumstances in the interest of substantial justice. One of the exceptional circumstances specifically listed is “unexpected illness or unexpected incapacity or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial.”
The testimony of the child victim of a sexual battery is certainly uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial. Since this child was willing to testify until one or two days prior to trial, we believe that the child’s reluctance to testify may be considered an unexpected and unforeseeable circumstance such as to warrant an extension of speedy trial.
Appellant also argues that the court erred when it placed him on community control without a time limit. Because sections 39.11(l)(a)(l) and 39.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) provide that the duration of the program shall not exceed the sentence that could be imposed if appellant were committed for the offense, or his nineteenth birthday, we remand to allow the trial court to correct the sentence to set forth the duration of his program of community control.
HALL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
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T.J. v. State, 743 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…is no need to include such language in a community control order. We recede from C.D.D. v. State, 684 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), M.T.H. v. State, 676 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), M.V. v. State, 507 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), to the extent these cases hold or suggest that an order placing a juvenile on community control requires a statement that community control will end at age nineteen. T.J. was…1 / 2
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T.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…aximum that an adult could be ordered to serve for the offense (battery of a school board employee) or the number of years until appellant’s nineteenth birthday, whichever is less. See F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); M.V. v. State, 507 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). DANAHY, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.…