S. MICHAEL SHLACHTMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
JAIME A. MITRANI AND ESTHER MITRANI, HIS WIFE AND ISRAEL MAGRISSO AND SUSAN MAGRISSO, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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A plaintiff who prevailed in a specific performance action appealed a trial court's reduction of his claimed attorney's fees and costs. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the "lodestar" approach from Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe applies only to statutory fees and fees ancillary to actions against nonclients, not to attorney's fees awarded in equity proceedings, and affirmed the trial court's discretionary reduction of the fees.
The trial court was not required to apply the lodestar approach to attorney's fees awarded in equity proceedings. The Rowe lodestar approach is limited to statutory fees and fees imposed ancillary to actions against nonclients. Equity courts have traditional discretion to apportion costs, and no abuse of discretion occurred here.
[1] The lodestar approach for calculating attorney's fees, as established in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. …
[2] Courts of equity traditionally possess discretion to apportion costs in a case.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rowe decision relates only to statutory fees and not to attorney's fees rendered generally, particularly in equity proceedings”
Establishes the limited scope of the lodestar approach and distinguishes equity-based fee awards from statutory fee awards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a successful specific performance suit, the plaintiff moved for attorney's fees and costs provided for in the deposit receipt agreement. The…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
Following a successful specific performance suit, the plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees and costs which were provided for in the deposit receipt agreement. In the final judgment granting specific performance, the trial court awarded fees and costs but reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount in a subsequent proceeding. The parties agreed that the matter would be submitted on affidavit. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit reflecting $2,161.64 in expenditures for costs and two affidavits in respect to attorney’s fees which indicated that a reasonable fee was $14,175.00. This was met by a six page memorandum questioning the reasonableness of many of the charges in the affidavit. The trial court entered a judgment for fees in the amount of $7,335.00 and costs in the amount of $938.09. Upon appeal, the plaintiff contends that even though the trial court has discretion in awarding fees, that under the “lodestar” approach, as found in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), it was required to pay the full amount reflected in the affidavits as to the amount of hours spent and the reasonable fee calculated thereon of $150 an hour. He also contends that the trial court had no discretion but to award the plaintiff his entire costs bill.
The appellees respond that the Rowe decision relates only to statutory fees and not to attorney’s fees rendered generally, particularly in equity proceedings, and lastly, that the court has discretion when a matter pends in equity to award less than the entire cost bill. We agree with the appellees in part and affirm. See Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla.3d DCA 1986).
The Rowe opinion is subject to the interpretation that it is limited in its application, “to fees imposed ancillary to the primary action against a nonclient, either under common law principles, see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F. 2d 161 (3rd Cir.1973) (Lindy I) (award of fees from a common fund created through efforts of attorney), or as in Rowe itself, and in Boyle and Lyons, pursuant to statutory authorization”, see Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, supra, and until such time as the supreme court makes it clear that the “lodestar” approach is to be used in any fee awards, its application should be so limited. Interestingly enough, if the plaintiff's position is correct, then when a jury verdict is rendered in a common law action for attorney’s fees pursuant to contract, the jury would have to make specific findings to meet such a requirement. Traditionally, equity courts have had the discretion to apportion costs and we find no abuse of discretion in the instant case. Akins v. Bethea, 160 Fla. 99, 33 So. 2d 638 (1948); Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Sullivan v. Rank, 132 So. 2d 37 (Fla.2d DCA 1961).
We have not overlooked the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Alston v. Sundeck Products Inc., 498 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), and realize that we are in conflict therewith; however, we respectfully decline to follow the holding of that case.
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Biltmore Constr. Co., Inc., 510 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…e the contract providing for assessment of fees to the prevailing party was executed in 1984, pri- or to Rowe. We are aware that the third district has limited the applicability of Rowe to statutorily awarded attorney’s fees. Shlachtman v. Mitrani, 508 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Nevertheless, we have previously held that Rowe applies whether the awarded attorney’s fees are based on entitlement by statute or by contract. Massey v. Watson, 508 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 50…
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Trend Coin Co. v. Fuller, Feingold & Mallah, P.A., 538 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…n-client either under common law principles ... or ... pursuant to statutory authorization.” Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159, 160 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied 500 So. 2d 545 [*922] (Fla.1986). See also Shlacktman v. Mitrani, 508 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 518 So. 2d 1278 (Fla.1987). Rowe has no application here. The appropriate criteria for determining the value of the discharged attorney’s services are enunciated in Rosenberg: “the totality of the circumstances surrou…
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Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sheehan, 537 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…y the fact that the rate exceeded the one fixed in the contract were necessary. This is true both because (a) Rowe does not even apply to a case, like this one, involving attorney’s fees imposed pursuant to a private contract, Shlachtman v. Mitrani, 508 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), dismissed, 518 So. 2d 1278 (Fla.1987); Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), pet. for review denied, 500 So. 2d 545 (Fla.1986); contra Alston v. Sundeck Prods., Inc. 498 So. 2d 493 (Fl…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)
- Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Cora Akins v. L. B. Bethea & the Perry Baking Co., 160 Fla. 99 (Fla. 1948)
- Stabinski, Funt & DE Oliveira, P.A. v. LAW Offs. OF Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Alston v. Sundeck Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Sullivan v. Rank, 132 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)