FRANK H. BARTLETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Bartlett challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a vehicle stop by a Fort Myers police officer. The court holds that the officer lacked well-founded suspicion to conduct the stop, finding the officer's suspicion rested on nothing more than a hunch based on Bartlett's presence in a high-crime area.
The stop was illegal because the officer lacked well-founded suspicion. The officer's suspicion was based on a mere hunch that Bartlett was in a high-crime area at night in a predominantly Black neighborhood. Neither Bartlett's presence in a high-crime area nor his parked status on a public street provides adequate basis for well-founded suspicion of criminal activity.
[1] A police officer may stop an individual only if a well-founded suspicion exists that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
[2] The totality of circumstances observed by an officer must be considered to determine if a stop was based on more than a mere hunch.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An officer may stop an individual if a well-founded suspicion is formed that the person targeted for the stop has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.”
Establishes the legal standard for justified vehicle stops under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 21, 1986, at approximately 9 p.m., Bartlett was sitting in his parked car in a high-crime area with two women standing beside the vehicle,…
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FRANK, Judge.
The appellant, Frank H. Bartlett, questions the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a stop of his vehicle by a Fort Myer’s police officer. The factual elements preceding the stop are that at approximately nine o’clock on the evening of February 21, 1986, the appellant was sitting in his parked automobile at a location testified to as a high crime area. Two women were standing at Bartlett’s side of the car apparently engaged in a conversation with him. The police officer, upon observing the three people talking, turned his patrol car around and returned to a point proximate to Bartlett’s car. At that moment Bartlett began to drive away. The officer stopped him and requested his driver’s license. An inquiry undertaken by the police officer at the scene disclosed that Bartlett’s license was suspended, and he was arrested. As soon as Bartlett arrived at the police station, his pockets were emptied and a small amount of cocaine was found. A search of his vehicle revealed marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Bartlett was charged with the illegal possession of controlled substances, paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended license. He unsuccessfully sought to suppress the contraband and paraphernalia. We find merit in Bartlett’s contention that the stop was illegal and reverse the trial court.
An officer may stop an individual if a well-founded suspicion is formed that the person targeted for the stop has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). The factual settings giving rise to a “well-founded suspicion” are myriad and often incapable of measurement by a precise formula.
That which is clear, however, is that the events witnessed by the officer are to be considered in their entirety in order to be assured that the officer acted upon more than a mere “hunch” that criminal activity lay at the base of the observed conduct. McCloud v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). In Codie v. State, 406 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), we identified factors to be evaluated in assessing whether illegal activity under-girded a well-founded suspicion: time, location, physical appearance of the suspect, his behavior, the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved, or anything incongruous or unusual in the situation. Id. at 119.
Here, Bartlett was in a high-crime area at approximately nine o’clock in the evening. He was parked on a public street speaking from his car with two women; but nothing unusual appeared to the officer and he testified that he stopped the appellant to determine “why he was out in, uh, that area, you know, predominantly black neighborhood, at that time.”
Based upon the record before us, it cannot be said that the police officer possessed more than a mere “hunch” that illegal activity was about to take place. That Bartlett was in a high crime area is not a sufficient basis upon which to justify a stop, G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and the fact that he was parked on a public street is. certainly not an adequate basis for a well-founded suspicion of potential criminal activity. Id.
Accordingly, we reverse, remand and direct that Bartlett be discharged from the charges stemming from the possession of the controlled substances and paraphernalia.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…ve a founded or reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense. Wilhelm v. State, 515 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Kibbee, 513 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Bartlett v. State, 508 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Kearse v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). A mere or bare suspicion is never suff…1 / 2
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Alphonzo McCREARY v. State, 538 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…e car contained two blacks and two whites, bore out-of-state tags, and was parked in an area known for drug activity. Mere presence in a predominantly black, high-crime area is not a sufficient basis upon which to justify a stop. Bartlett v. State, 508 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Cobb v. State, 511 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Furthermore, the fact that an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity is based in part on the fact that the car in which the defendant was riding contained a racially-mixed group…
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Anthanase Williams v. State, 564 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The factors to be considered in determining whether illegal activity supported a “well-founded” suspicion are time, location, physical appearance, behavior and anything unusual in the situation. Bartlett v. State, 508 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Here, it was the middle of the day, in a place common for people to stand and talk. Given that the movement of Williams’ hands to his mouth could have been for many legal reasons, the officers did not have a well-founded suspicio…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- LaMarcus Edward Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- McCLOUD v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Levie Codie v. State, 406 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)