CHRISTOPHER HANSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1987-06-24
No. 4-86-2686
WALDEN and STONE, JJ., concur.
508 So. 2d 780 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1987) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Christopher Hanson was convicted of sexual battery and attempted sexual battery upon a child under twelve, as well as lewd, lascivious or indecent assault upon a child under sixteen. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding that while the trial court erred in admitting hearsay identifying the perpetrator by name, the error was harmless given corroborating evidence.


Holding

While it was error for the physician to recite the perpetrator's name in the victim's hearsay statement, the error was harmless because the record contained the victim's direct testimony, the defendant's inculpatory statement, and the child's diary documenting the episodes, making the physician's mention of the name merely cumulative.


Headnotes

[1] Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible under a hearsay exception if they describe medical history, symptoms, or the cause of inj…

[2] A physician may testify to a victim's statements regarding the cause of injury if those statements are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

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Key Quotes

“It was not error in the instant case for the physician to testify that the victim said that someone had sex with her, it was error — albeit harmless in this case — for the physician to recite the name of the person who had sex with her.”

Establishes the distinction between admissible medical history testimony and inadmissible identification of the perpetrator by name.

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Facts & Procedural History

A physician examined a young victim and testified about statements the child made during the medical evaluation. The victim told the physician that "C…

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Opinion of the Court
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of sexual battery and attempted sexual battery upon a child under twelve as well as lewd, lascivious or indecent assault upon a child under sixteen. We affirm.

Defendant raises three issues here, only one of which bears discussion; namely, whether the trial court should have sus- tamed the defendant’s objection to the testimony of the physician who examined the victim. The questioned testimony is as follows:

Q. What did you talk about with Stephanie?

A. I have written down what she told me. This was done way back. I don’t remember exactly but I have notes, my notes here.

Q. What was it?

A. She said, “Chris Hanson.”

* * * *

(Objection was made by appellant’s counsel and was overruled by court)

Q. What did she say?

A. Chris Hanson had sex with her about four or five times this summer and she said it happened at his house and she denied having any boyfriends.

Section 90.803(4), Florida Statutes (1985) provides an exception to the hearsay rule, as follows:

STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT — Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis or treatment, or made by an individual who has knowledge of the facts and is legally responsible for the person who is unable to communicate the facts, which statements describe medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inceptions or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably' pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

It was not error in the instant case for the physician to testify that the victim said that someone had sex with her, it was error — albeit harmless in this case — for the physician to recite the name of the person who had sex with her. Here, as in Begley v. State, 483 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), not only was there the testimony of the victim, but also the defendant’s inculpatory statement. Moreover, in this case the child kept a diary of the episodes. Hence the physician’s mention of the perpetrator’s name was merely cumulative.

WALDEN and STONE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …was not admissible under section 90.803(4), because it was “not ‘reasonably pertinent’ to the diagnosis of whether she was pregnant;” hence the statement was not deemed sufficiently trustworthy to fall within the hearsay exception); Hanson v. State, 508 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (trial court erred— although the error was harmless — in permitting attending physician of child sexual abuse victim to relate the name of the person who abused her); Saul v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 499 So.…
    1 / 3
  • Lazarowicz v. State, 561 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
    …ng made for this purpose. Begley v. State, 483 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The record in this case is devoid of any such showing. Accordingly, Jennifer’s prior consistent statements to the nurse should not have been admitted, see Hanson v. State, 508 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Begley, 483 So. 2d at 70, although these statements may be admissible on retrial if a purpose pertinent to diagnosis or treatment is demonstrated. We conclude that the erroneous admission of Jennifer’s prior consistent statemen…
  • State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993)
    …d victims of sexual abuse generally have followed the rule that statements to medical personnel identifying the perpetrator are not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. See State v. Ochoa, 576 So. 2d 854, 855 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA1991); Hanson v. State, 508 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA1987). In Flanagan, however, the First District Court of Appeal relied on a line of federal cases construing a similar medical diagnosis or treatment exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence7 to find that statements of identity by chi…

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