GILFORD DAVID ROBINSON, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE MARY ANN MACKENZIE, AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE FOR THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could vacate a jury's guilty verdict of attempted first-degree murder and reinstate a first-degree murder conviction after the jury had been discharged and dispersed. The court held that jury verdicts are final once rendered and jurors are dismissed, and that errors arising from juror misapprehension of law cannot be corrected through post-verdict proceedings.
The trial court improperly vacated the verdict and entered a new adjudication. Jury verdicts are sacrosanct and become final when jurors disperse. Errors arising from jurors' misapprehension of law inhere in the verdict and are not subject to collateral attack or correction. The adjudication of first-degree murder is quashed and the adjudication of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm is reinstated.
[1] A jury verdict is generally final and cannot be altered after the jury has been discharged, absent clerical mistakes or outside influences that prevented the return of th…
[2] Matters arising from a jury's misapprehension of the law during deliberations inhere in the verdict and are not subject to collateral attack.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A jury verdict is sacrosanct unless clerical mistakes or outside influences thwart return of the jury's intended verdict.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that jury verdicts are protected from post-verdict modification except in narrow circumstances.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury returned a verdict finding Robinson guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. The jury was polled and confirmed the verdict was u…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Matters Inhering In The Verdict cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This case arises from an unusual set of circumstances.1 The jury returned a verdict finding Robinson guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.
The record discloses that when the clerk polled the jury, all the jurors agreed that the announced verdict was theirs.
Pursuant to the verdict, the court adjudged Robinson guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. The court then discharged the jurors, and they dispersed. Several hours later, and despite the time constraints of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.570,2 the state filed a motion to vacate the adjudication of attempted first-degree murder. In its motion, the state argued that the jury had returned the wrong verdict and that it had intended to return a verdict of first-degree murder. The court recalled the jurors, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and vacated the adjudication. The court then entered an adjudication as to first-degree murder with a firearm.
We find that the trial court's action constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law.
A jury verdict is sacrosanct unless clerical mistakes or outside influences thwart return of the jury’s intended verdict. Verdicts based on the jury’s misapprehension of the law are not subject to collateral attack because matters considered during deliberations inhere in the verdict. State v. Blasi, 411 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); see Sims v. State, 444 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246, 104 S.Ct. 3525, 82 L.Ed.2d 832 (1984). Challenges arising from mere clerical error, however, may result in corrective action if the jurors have not been “contaminated” by events occurring subsequent to their separation. See Blasi.
We reject the state’s characterization of the problem in this case as mere clerical error justifying the trial court’s actions. A review of the record discloses circumstances that cannot be described as clerical error. Testimony from the evidentiary hearing reveals that the jurors had signed several verdict forms prior to reaching their final decision. Although one of those forms was for first-degree murder, the jury intentionally discarded it when it agreed upon and returned the attempted first-degree murder form. According to the testimony, ten jurors thought their verdict signified felony murder in the first degree; on the other hand, two jurors understood the verdict to be “first-degree murder,” while three jurors testified that the jury had rejected a finding of guilt of premeditated first-degree murder.
Thus, it is clear that if error occurred, it resulted from the jurors’ misapprehension of law, and was not the result of a scrivener’s error. Under those circumstances, the matters addressed by the trial court inhered in the verdict and were not subject to reconsideration. See Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla.1957); Marks v. State Road Dep’t, 69 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1954); Smith v. State, 330 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); State ex rel. D'Andrea v. Smith, 183 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); cf. Blasi (where foreman signed wrong verdict form, mistake does not inhere in the verdict).
But cf. Crapps v. Murchek, 330 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (new trial granted where jury unanimous in its finding of justifiable homicide mistakenly concluded that its finding was synonymous with verdict of manslaughter).
Finding that the trial court improperly relied on matters that inhered in the verdict, that the verdict became final when the jurors dispersed, and that no exception to the finality of the jury verdict authorized the court to vacate the verdict, we quash the adjudication as to first-degree murder with a firearm.
Certiorari granted; adjudication of first-degree murder quashed; adjudication of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm reinstated; remanded for sentencing.
. We treat Robinson's petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus as a petition for writ of certiorari. Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.570 provides:
No irregularity in the rendition or reception of a verdict may be raised unless it is raised before the jury is discharged. No irregularity in the recording of a verdict shall affect its validity unless the defendant was in fact prejudiced by such irregularity.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brown v. State, 611 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…nt to the verdict, the trial court adjudged the defendant guilty of attempted murder in the second degree with a weapon and sentenced him. Therefore, the trial court acted according to the essential requirement of the law. See Robinson v. MacKenzie, 508 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987). The defendant’s final contention is that the trial court erred in imposing an upward departure sentence where the reasons stated by the trial court for departure are invalid. We disagree. The…
-
Sentinel Commc'ns Co. v. Hon. John W. Watson, III, 615 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…DCA 1991) (proffered matters merely opinion of jurors as to reason verdict rendered; no evidence of improper agreement); Phares v. Froehlich, 582 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (impressions of jurors as to why reached verdict); Robinson v. MacKenzie, 508 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987) (verdict based on misapprehension of law); Powell v. State, 414 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (juror said she didn’t mean to convict but felt intimidated and hurried). Concerning the court’s…
-
Brown v. State, 661 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…owly limited to determining whether a verdict duly arrived at had been misrecorded. Cf Blasi, Masters. “A jury verdict is sacrosanct unless clerical mistakes or outside influences thwart return of the jury’s intended verdict.” Robinson v. MacKenzie, 508 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (3d DCA 1987), review denied sub nom. MacKenzie v. Robinson, 518 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987). The inquiry here ranged broadly over the substance of the jury’s deliberations, without focussing on the essential preliminary question whether the jury h…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957)
- Marks v. State Rd. Dep't, 69 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1954)
- Sims v. State, 444 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1983)
- Palmer v. United States, 467 U.S. 1246 (U.S. 1984)
- Durant v. United States, 467 U.S. 1246 (U.S. 1984)
- Smith v. State, 330 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Thomas Michael D'Andrea v. Smith, 183 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- State v. Blasi, 411 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Crapps v. Murchek, 330 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)