CHESTER CLARK, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
SHARON S. CLARK, APPELLEE
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Husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ordered his estate to pay permanent periodic alimony to his ex-wife upon his death. The court affirms the dissolution and attorney's fees judgments but reverses the alimony provision requiring the estate to continue payments after the husband's death, holding that alimony obligations cease upon the obligor's death unless expressly agreed otherwise.
An alimony obligation ceases upon the death of the obligor unless the obligor expressly agrees the estate shall be bound to continue payments. Section 61.08(3) does not authorize ordering an estate to pay alimony; it only authorizes the court to order the obligor to purchase life insurance, post a bond, or secure the alimony award with other assets. The trial court may exercise these statutory options to protect the alimony award.
[1] An obligation to pay alimony ceases upon the death of the obligor, unless the obligor expressly agrees that their estate shall be bound to continue payments.
[2] Section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985), authorizes a court to order a party to secure an alimony award with life insurance, a bond, or other suitable assets, but does…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the well-established rule is that an obligation to pay alimony ceases upon the death of the obligor, unless that person expressly agrees that the estate shall be bound to continue to pay alimony after his death”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that alimony obligations terminate at death absent express agreement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced by final judgment. The trial court ordered the husband to pay permanent periodic alimony to the wife and further ordered tha…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
Husband appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the subsequent final judgment for attorney’s fees and costs.
We affirm both judgments in all respects except we agree with the husband’s contention that the trial court erred in ordering that his estate be obligated to pay permanent periodic alimony to his former wife if he predeceases her. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to amend the final judgment.
The well-established rule is that an obligation to pay alimony ceases upon the death of the obligor, unless that person expressly agrees that the estate shall be bound to continue to pay alimony after his death. O’Malley v. Pan American Bank of Orlando, N.A., 384 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1980). The wife, however, asserts that the continued vitality of that judicial rule is in serious doubt as a result of the amendment to section 61.08, Florida Statutes (effective January 1, 1985). According to the wife, the trial court’s authority to order that her permanent periodic alimony shall be chargeable against her former husband’s estate is permitted by the following statute:
To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.
Section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985).
She maintains that, although the statute does not specifically authorize such an award, the statute can be construed to give the trial court discretion to award a spouse permanent periodic alimony that shall become chargeable against the estate of the former spouse.
We disagree with the wife’s interpretation of section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985). Clearly, the language of the statute only authorizes a trial court to order, to the extent it is necessary to protect the award of alimony, that a spouse purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or secure the alimony award with other assets. Section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985).
In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court did not exercise any of these statutory options. However, it is equally apparent that the trial court was concerned with providing the wife with security to protect the alimony award after the husband’s death, in light of her poor health and lack of employability. Therefore, the trial court, at its discretion, may amend the final judgment to protect the alimony award as authorized by section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (1985).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.
LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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Goldie Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989)…. We have for review an opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sobelman v. Sobelman, 516 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), which is in express and direct conflict with Fiveash v. Fiveash, 523 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) and Clark v. Clark, 509 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. After twenty-two years of marriage, Goldie and Alan Sobelman obtained a divorce. The final judgement of dissolution of marriage awarded $1,250.00 per month to the wife as per…1 / 2
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Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…imposition of such an insurance requirement would be “appropriate.” The court did, however, refer to “protecting] the financial well[-]being of the other spouse.” Id. at 1154. And the So-belman court favorably cited the decisions in Clark v. Clark, 509 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), and Fiveash v. Fiveash, 523 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), describing them as eases where “the wives were in ill health and for all practical purposes unable to obtain employment,” and the trial courts “were concerned with the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Iva C. O'Malley v. PAN Am. Bank OF Orlando, 384 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1980)