SERA MARTELL, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY KUCZKIR, MICHAEL KUCZKIR, ANTHONY DEFRANK, ANNIE MAY DEFRANK, WILLIAM FANNY AND MITZI FANNY, APPELLEES
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Plaintiff Martell accepted a formal offer of judgment in a libel case under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1442. After acceptance, the defendant Kuczkir's counsel attempted to condition the offer on releasing claims beyond those in the lawsuit through an informal letter, which the trial court incorporated into the final judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding that an offer of judgment cannot be unilaterally amended by informal letter after being formally made, and that Martell's acceptance bound the parties to the original offer terms alone.
The trial court erred in treating the offer of judgment as amended by the informal letter. An offer of judgment cannot be modified by informal correspondence after being formally made without formal withdrawal, formal amendment by written document, court leave, and agreement by all co-defendants who joined in the original offer. Martell's acceptance bound the parties to the original offer terms without the additional release condition.
[1] An offer of judgment made pursuant to Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is not automatically amended by a subsequent letter from counsel purporting to ad…
[2] A trial court errs in entering a judgment that includes provisions for the release of claims beyond those asserted in the litigation when the plaintiff accepted an offer…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the trial court erred in deciding that the appellant accepted the offer of judgment as amended by the letter and by including a provision in the final judgment for release of claims other than those asserted in the lawsuit.”
States the core holding that the trial court incorrectly treated the original offer as modified by the informal letter.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartell sued defendants including Kuczkir for libel. All defendants made a formal offer of judgment pursuant to Florida Rule 1442. After the formal of…
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STONE, Judge.
Martel sued Kuczkir and other parties for libel. All defendants, each having separate counsel, made an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule L442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. After the formal offer was made, counsel for defendant Kuczkir sent a letter to plaintiff’s lawyer stating that the original offer was conditioned on a release of other potential claims not in the litigation. The plaintiff accepted the original offer in accordance with the Rule with out reference to the separate letter.
The trial court determined that counsel for Kuczkir did not seek to withdraw the initial offer, to amend it by a formal document, or seek leave of court to amend or clarify it. No effort was made to have the co-defendant, who had joined in the initial offer, join in the amendment. Plaintiff found himself in a position that could have resulted in a cost judgment had he rejected the initial offer. No evidentiary hearing was held. Motions to strike that had been filed after the acceptance were withdrawn by all parties. No issues of fact were presented to the trial court. The appellees do not contend that the appellant intended to consent to the terms of the letter and there is nothing in the record to support such a position.
The trial judge was presented by the parties with only two choices, best summed up by counsel for one of the other defendants at a brief motion hearing:
I would respectfully suggest the case is not going to trial. Because if Karen gets what she wants, she’s going to get her judgment and not give releases and the case is over. If we get what we want, she’s going to get her money, she’s going to give releases and the case is over. Nobody is going to ask you to go to trial.
So the trial issue is not really germane of what we’re talking about. The only issue is going to be does she get the money and have to give up the releases or does she get the money and have to satisfy the judgment. That’s the only issue.
We conclude that the trial court erred in deciding that the appellant accepted the offer of judgment as amended by the letter and by including a provision in the final judgment for release of claims other than those asserted in the lawsuit. We therefore need not consider what other options were available here, or any other conditions under which an offer of judgment may be amended before acceptance. See generally, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1986); Boorstein v. City of New York, 107 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N. Y.1985); Weston v. Kuntz, 635 P. 2d 269 (Mont.1981); Morris K. Udall, May Offers of Judgment Under Rule 68 Be Revoked Before Acceptance?, 19 F.R.D.
401. The final judgment is reversed. We remand for entry of a judgment in accordance with the offer of judgment as accepted.
DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.