RAMON GARCIA-PEREZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Garcia-Perez was convicted of cocaine trafficking based primarily on officer testimony about possessing the drug. The appellate court reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony about an informant's tip, and this error was not harmless given the jury's credibility determination was dispositive.
The conviction is reversed because the trial court erred in admitting the informant hearsay testimony, and this error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given that the verdict turned entirely on the jury's credibility choice between competing accounts.
[1] Admission of unadulterated hearsay is not permissible under probable cause or explanation of officer's course of action exceptions to the hearsay rule.
[2] Where a jury's verdict necessarily depends on crediting certain testimony and rejecting contrary testimony, an erroneous admission of evidence cannot be deemed harmless b…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where, as in the present case, the verdict finding the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine necessarily depended on the jury's crediting Officer Aguillar's testimony that he actually saw the defendant in possession of the cocaine and their rejecting the defendant's contrary testimony that Aguillar removed the cocaine from the automobile in which the defendant, by his own account unaware of the cocaine's presence, was riding, we cannot conscientiously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conceded error — the admission of Aguillar's testimony that preceding the defendant's arrest an informant told Aguillar that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine — did not affect the verdict.”
States the harmless error analysis and the court's conclusion that the erroneous admission of hearsay was not harmless.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Aguillar testified that he saw Garcia-Perez in possession of cocaine. Garcia-Perez testified he was unaware of the cocaine's presence in the a…
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PER CURIAM.
Where, as in the present case, the verdict finding the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine necessarily depended on the jury’s crediting Officer Aguillar’s testimony that he actually saw the defendant in possession of the cocaine and their rejecting the defendant’s contrary testimony that Aguillar removed the cocaine from the automobile in which the defendant, by his own account unaware of the cocaine’s presence, was riding, we cannot conscientiously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conceded error1 — the admission of Aguillar’s testimony that preceding the defendant’s arrest an informant told Aguillar that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine2 — did not affect the verdict. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ., concur. . The State, acknowledging the error, argues only that it is harmless.
. The officer’s testimony, admitted over the defendant's objection, was:
"I received a phone call which told me that the co-defendant and the defendant and a female will be coming from Hialeah to the address of 1629 Northwest North River Drive where they will be coming in a brown Cutlass Supreme and that the co-defendant will be selling five to six ounces of cocaine to the defendant and that they would have it in their possession and...."
There is neither a "probable cause" exception to the hearsay rule, Wells v. State, 477 So. 2d 26, 27 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), nor an "explanation of the officer's course of action" exception, Sil-veira-Hemandez v. State, 495 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), which would allow this unadulterated hearsay to be admitted.
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I believe that the officer’s recounting of the events in question was so persuasive and specific and the defendant’s contrary explanation of the circumstances so incredible that the plain error committed below should be regarded as harmless. See McGriff v. State, 497 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Accordingly, I would affirm.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Jones v. State, 477 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Silveira-Hernandez v. State, 495 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Deen v. Zaremba Fla. Co., 497 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- McGRIFF v. State, 497 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Putts v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 414 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Carlton Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)