JACOB OHANESSIAN, MICHAEL D'ADDABBO, DONALD J. GRIGGS, AND TERRY B. FLETCHER, APPELLANTS,
v.
EUGENE E. THOMASON, APPELLEE
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Appellants sued multiple defendants in Pinellas County, Florida. When one defendant, Thomason, moved to dismiss for improper venue citing his Hillsborough County residence, the trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reversed, holding that venue was proper in Pinellas County because other codefendants resided there, and the burden of proving improper venue was not met.
Venue was proper in Pinellas County for all defendants, including Thomason. Under Florida statute section 47.021, when multiple defendants are involved, venue is proper in any county where any defendant resides. Thomason failed to meet his burden of clearly proving venue was improper, and the fact that he became the only remaining defendant did not retroactively invalidate the initial venue selection.
[1] Venue is proper in the county where any of multiple defendants reside.
[2] A defendant contesting venue has the burden to clearly prove that the plaintiff's chosen venue is improper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When, as here, there is more than one defendant, the defendant's residence under section 47.011 for venue purposes is any county in which any of the defendants reside.”
Establishes the governing legal standard that venue is proper in any county where any codefendant resides
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants filed separate actions in Pinellas County against trustees of dissolved Florida corporations and two individuals: Richard L. Benware and Eu…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, Jacob Ohanessian, Michael D’Addabbo, Donald J. Griggs, and Terry B. Fletcher, appeal a trial court order granting a motion to dismiss for improper venue as to appellee, Eugene E. Thomason. We reverse.
Each of the appellants initially filed separate actions in Pinellas County against the trustees of three dissolved Florida corporations and against Richard L. Benware and appellee Thomason individually. The actions were consolidated for all purposes. Defendants Richard L. Benware and Joann Benware, residents of Pinellas County and trustees of the property and assets of the named dissolved Florida corporations, and Richard L. Benware, individually, failed to timely file responsive pleadings. A default and final judgment were entered against them. Thomason subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that under the facts and circumstances of the case, venue was proper only in Hillsbor-ough County where he resided.
The trial court entered a final order granting the motion to dismiss the action as to Thoma-son for improper venue. This timely appeal followed.
Venue is proper in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrues, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1985). When, as here, there is more than one defendant, the defendant’s residence under section 47.011 for venue purposes is any county in which any of the defendants reside. § 47.021, Fla.Stat. (1985).
Accordingly, because venue was proper in Pinellas County as to the Benwares, Thomason’s codefendants, venue was proper in Pinellas County for all defendants, including Tho-mason who resided in Hillsborough County.
Moreover, a defendant who desires to contest the venue chosen by the plaintiff has the burden of clearly proving that the venue selected by the plaintiff is improper. United Engines, Inc. v. Citmoco Services, Inc., 418 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Thomason did not dispute the fact that the Benwares resided in Pinellas County nor did he offer any evidence to show that venue as selected by the appellants was at any time improper as to the Benwares. Since the appellants had no burden of proving that their initial selection of venue was proper and since Thomason did not meet his burden of clearly proving that the venue selected by the appellants was improper, we find no merit in Thomason’s contention that since the appellants did not argue the applicability of section 47.021 to the trial court, this court cannot now consider the applicability of this section.
Finally, the fact that Thomason was the only remaining defendant in the action at the time of the trial court’s ruling did not affect the propriety of the initial selection of venue so as to require that the action be transferred to the home county of the remaining defendant, Thomason, because there is no indication that the appellants lacked good faith in suing the resident defendants, the Benwares. See Vance v. Minton, 444 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
We, accordingly, reverse the trial court order dismissing this case for improper venue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
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MML Dev. Corp. v. Eagle Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 603 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…main in that county even though the action has evolved into one to enforce a promissory note “denuded” of the security of the Volusia County real property. It relies on Vance v. Minton, 444 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), and Ohanessian v. Thomason, 510 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), in resisting MML’s attempt to transfer venue. In Vance, two physicians residing in different Florida counties were joined in an action for medical malpractice. After two years of litigation, including extensive discovery proceed…
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Walsh v. Martinez, 686 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…ugh County. Because venue was properly set in Pinellas County when the action began, we reverse. See, e.g., Vance v. Minton, 444 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (holding that venue privilege attaches when action is commenced); Ohanessian v. Thomason, 510 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the action to proceed in Pinellas County. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.…
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Rabin v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Revenue, 884 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…where venue would not be proper, if the case were initiated by the remaining party or parties, venue may be retained where venue, as here, was proper when the action began. Vance v. Minton, 444 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Ohanessian v. Thomason, 510 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In MML Development Corporation v. Eagle National Bank of Miami 603 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), however, the Fifth District noted the purpose of the rule announced in Vance was to avoid disruption of trial. Id. at 647. In Vanc…
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- United Engines, Inc. v. Citmoco Servs., Inc., 418 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)