DANIEL LEE HOAG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Lee Hoag was convicted of seven offenses arising from a single traffic accident in which he drove while intoxicated, killed one pedestrian, injured four others, and fled the scene. The appellate court reversed convictions for manslaughter by culpable negligence and four counts of leaving the scene with injury, finding that multiple convictions under the same statute for a single criminal act violated double jeopardy rights.
The court reversed the conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence because two statutory homicide convictions for one death violates double jeopardy. The court also reversed four of the five leaving-the-scene convictions because all violations arose from a single failure to stop at one scene, constituting but one criminal act despite multiple resulting injuries and one death.
[1] Double jeopardy rights are violated by multiple convictions for the same statutory offense arising from a single factual event.
[2] A single failure to stop at the scene of an accident constitutes one offense under statutes requiring drivers to stop after an accident resulting in injury or death, rega…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The defendant's constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated by his two convictions for two statutory homicides as to but one death.”
Establishes the core holding regarding manslaughter convictions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHoag, while intoxicated, negligently struck a group of pedestrians with his vehicle, resulting in one death and four injuries. He did not stop at the …
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COWART, Judge.
The defendant, Daniel Lee Hoag, intoxicated and driving a motor vehicle, negligently struck a group of pedestrians, killing one and injuring four. He did not stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident. He was convicted of seven offenses, viz: manslaughter by driving while intoxicated (§ 316.1931(2), Fla.Stat.); manslaughter by culpable negligence (§ 782.07, Fla.Stat.); leaving the scene of an accident with a death (§ 316.027, Fla.Stat.); and four counts of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries (§ 316.027, Fla.Stat.). He appeals.
The defendant’s constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated by his two convictions for two statutory homicides as to but one death. See Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1985); Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence (§ 782.07, Fla.Stat.) is reversed and vacated.
Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident. The gist of this statute is the failure of a driver of a vehicle involved to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death. Although Hoag’s accident caused four injuries and one death, there was but one scene of the accident and one failure to stop. In Miles v. State, 418 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), a defendant was required to appear in court as to two charges. He was later convicted twice for violation of section 843.15(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which made it an offense to willfully fail to appear as required. Although Miles was required to appear at one time and place as to two charges, he failed to appear (the gist of that offense) only once.
Accordingly, this court held that to be convicted twice under the same statutory offense as to the same factual event violated Miles’ double jeopardy rights and reversed one conviction. Just as Miles’ failure one time and at one place to appear constituted but one offense although his appearance in court was required as to two charges, likewise, the failure of Hoag to stop at the scene of his accident constituted but one offense although that accident resulted in injuries to four persons and the death of a fifth. Hoag’s five convictions of the same statutory offense as to the same factual event violated Hoag’s double jeopardy rights. See also Burke v. State, 475 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 6th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1986), where this court held that giving three altered dollar bills to one person at one time constituted but one criminal act of uttering. Hoag’s second, third, fourth, and fifth convictions of violating section 316.027, Florida Statutes, are reversed and vacated.
Because the convictions here vacated were scored in, and affected the calculation of, the guidelines sentence imposed in this case, the defendant on remand will, at his option1, be entitled to be resentenced based on a new scoresheet. We find Hoag’s other arguments are without merit or are rendered moot by our decision in this case.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., and GREEN, O.L., Associate Judge, concur. . While attacking his convictions on appeal, the defendant did not specifically request that his sentence be vacated. Unless the defendant elects to be resentenced, he is entitled to not he resentenced. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 508 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
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Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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Flowers v. State, 567 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…although his appearance on that occasion related to two different matters, this court held that to be convicted twice under the same statutory offense as to the same factual event violated Miles’ double jeopardy rights. Similarly, in Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1278 (Fla.1987), the defendant left the scene of an accident in which four persons were injured and one person was killed. The defendant was convicted of five counts of leaving the scene of an accident in…
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Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ltiple victims. However, our reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended “unit of prosecution” for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents. The Fifth District addressed this very issue in Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), with regard to the predecessor statute. In Hoag, the defendant was involved in a single automobile accident which resulted in injury to four people and the death of another. The defendant was convicted of four counts of leaving…
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Papageorge v. State, 710 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ent and one failure to stop, we find that Appellant’s multiple convictions for leaving the scene of an accident violated his double jeopardy rights. See Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979, 23 Fla.L.Weekly D345 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.28, 1998); Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (finding that the “unit of prosecution” for violating the statute requiring a driver to stop when involved in an accident resulting in injury or death was not the number of victims injured, but the number of accidents). According…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ramsey v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)
- Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)
- Miles v. State, 418 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Dolan Robert Kelly v. State, 508 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Burke v. State, 475 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)