STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
INES DE LONDONO, APPELLEE
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State Farm's appeal of a jury verdict for the insured homeowner was affirmed because the ambiguous term "regularly rented" in the policy's exclusions clause presented a factual question properly submitted to the jury rather than a pure question of law.
Where an insurance policy term is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, the question of its meaning is a fact issue for the jury rather than a pure question of law for the court.
[1] Where an insurance policy term is not defined and is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, the question of its meaning is a fact issue for the jury rather…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA homeowner leased out her home and furnishings for one year on a one-time basis while traveling abroad on business, and the furnishings were destroye…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
A claim for personal property loss was brought under a homeowner’s policy containing an exclusions clause which provided, “We do not cover [content] property regularly rented or held for rental to others. ...” The facts show that the insured homeowner leased out the home and furnishings for one year on a one-time basis while out of the country on a business trip. During that period the furnishings were destroyed by fire. An issue arose as to whether the home was regularly rented. That question was submitted to the jury. The insurer brings this appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for the insured contending that construction of the contract presented a question of law which the court should have decided in the insured’s favor. We disagree.
Although the construction of a contract is ordinarily a matter of law, where the terms of a written instrument are disputed and are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented. Quayside Associates, Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Assoc., 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The instant policy did not define “regularly rented”; the parties disagreed as to what the term meant; and the trial court was of the view, correctly, that the term was reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. It was, thus, proper to submit the question to the jury to be decided as an issue of fact. Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Affirmed.
DANIEL S. PEARSON, J., concurs.
JORGENSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The crucial language of the policy, i.e., “property regularly rented or held for rental to others,” is not amenable to multiple constructions. This language is not ambiguous. It is clear that pursuant to this language a one-year rental of the subject property qualified as “property regularly rented or held for rental to others.” The fact that an insurance policy requires analysis to comprehend its scope does not mean it is ambiguous. Hess v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). There was no reason for the question of coverage to be presented to the jury. In the absence of ambiguity, the question was one of law for the trial court’s resolution. See Central Cold Storage, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 461 So. 2d 115 (Fla.1984).
The trial court erred in permitting the jury to pass on this question since State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I would reverse.
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Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. George Azar, M.D., 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…Munim. We find the trial court’s interpretation of an ambiguous clause, drafted by Dr. Munim’s attorneys, to be reasonable and we uphold the trial court’s interpretation as not being clearly erroneous. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. De Londono, 511 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. dismissed, 519 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1987); Howard v. Howard, 467 So. 2d 768, 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). THIRD YEAR CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES While we agree with the trial court’s method of determining damages, we disagree with the tri…
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Lambert v. The Berkley S. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 680 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…Continental Hotels, Inc. v. Broward Vending, Inc., 404 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Whether a document is ambiguous depends upon whether it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. De Londono, 511 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. dismissed, 519 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1987). However, a true ambiguity does not exist merely because a document can possibly be interpreted in more than one manner. American Medical Int’l, Inc. v. Scheller, 462 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 19…
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Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Hess v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Astrin v. The Int'l Bank OF Miami, N.A., 452 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Cent. Cold Storage, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)