BUCK DAUGHTREY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Buck Daughtrey was convicted as an accessory to larceny based on an indictment that alleged the principal's conviction using language that included qualifying words 'by a jury.' The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indictment's allegation of conviction must be broad enough to include the judgment of conviction, not merely a jury verdict, and that the qualifying words improperly narrowed the meaning of 'convicted.'
The Court held that the indictment was deficient because the qualifying words 'by a jury' improperly narrowed the meaning of 'convicted' to exclude the judgment of conviction, confining it to a mere jury verdict. An indictment alleging the principal's conviction must be broad enough to include the judgment or sentence of conviction, not merely the verdict.
“the conviction required includes the judgment of conviction, and not merely the verdict of the jury.”
Establishes the governing legal principle that conviction for accessory liability purposes must include the final judgment, not just the jury verdict.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaughtrey was indicted in DeSoto County Circuit Court as an accessory before and after the fact to larceny. The indictment alleged that Melvin Corbett…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Accessory Before The Fact cases and more on FLexlaw
Carter, P. J.
Plaintiff in error was indicted, tried and convicted in the-Circuit Court of DeSoto county upon an indictment purporting to charge him as an accessory before as well as an accessory after the fact to the felony of larceny.
Several assignments of error question the regularity of the term of the court at which the indictment was found and the trial had, but these assignments depend upon the same facts as do similar questions raised in the case of Peeples v. State, decided at this term, and are disposed of by the decision in that case.
The indictment does not charge the guilt of the alleged principal, but merely that he had been convicted of the principal felony at a former term of the court. The allegation with respect to the conviction is “that heretofore, to-wit: at the fall term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida sitting in and for the county of DeSoto aforesaid for the }?ear A. D. 1902, one Melvin Corbett was by the name of said Melvin Corbett duly convicted by a jury of said Circuit Court aforesaid for that,” etc., reciting the allegations of the indictment against Corbett. This is the form given by Mr. Bishop (Directions & Forms, sec. 117) except that the words “by a jury of said Circuit Court aforesaid,” following the word “convicted,” do not appear in Mr. Bishop’s form. The defendant moved to quash the indictment, one ground being based upon the use of the qualifying words “by a jury,” etc. The court denied the motion, and the second assignment of error questions the propriety of this ruling. Mr. Bishop states that the accessory may be indicted separately from the principal either before or after the latter’s conviction. If before, the indictment must aver the principal’s guilt. If after, the indictment may allege either the guilt of the principal, or that he has been convicted without averring his guilt. Directions & Forms, sec. 117; 2 New Crim. Proc., sec.
11. In this case the pleader adopted the latter course, i. e., alleging the conviction without averring the guilt of the principal. The allegation is that the principal was duly convicted “by a jury,” etc. Is this allegation sufficient, notwithstanding the use of the qualifying words “by a jury,” etc.? In order to determine this it will be necessary to ascertain what is included in the term “conviction,” within the meaning of the rule authorizing the conviction of the principal to be alleged in indictments of this character. By the common law, and in this State, the conviction of the principal is an essential prerequisite (except in cases not necessary to be noticed) to the punishment of the accessory. Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 South. Rep. 459; Ex parte Bowen, 25 Fla. 214; 6 South. Rep.
65. And the conviction required includes the judgment of conviction, and not merely the verdict of the jury. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, sec. 668; 2 Bish. New Crim. Proc., sec. 12; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, sec. 237; 1 McClain Crim. Law, sec.
216. We think, therefore, that fin indictments of this character the allegation must be broad enough to include the judgment or sentence of conviction (Bishop’s Directions & Forms, sec. 94; Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 69, and not merely the verdict of the jury. If the qualifying words “by a jury,” etc., had been omitted from this indictment, we are not prepared to say that the allegation “was duly convicted” would not be sufficient to include the judgment of conviction, and consequently to require proof of the judgment in order to prove the allegation, but we think the additional words “by a jury,” etc., qualify the meaning of the word “convicted,” and confine its meaning to a mere conviction by the verdict of a jury, which is sufficient. In other words, this allegation would be sustained by proof of a verdict of guilty, though no sentence had been passed, or a new trial had been granted.
The judgment is reversed with directions that the Circuit Court grant the motion to quash.
Maxwell and Cockrell, JJ., concur. Taylor, C. J., and Hooker and Shackleford, JJ., concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299 (Fla. 1925)…e that the conviction of the principals is an essential prerequisite, except in certain cases, to the punishment of the accessory. See Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 South. Rep. 459; Ex parte Bowen, 25 Fla. 214, 6 South. Rep. 65; Daughtrey v. State, 46 Fla. 109, 35 South. Rep. 397. In the Daughtrey case the accessory was indicted separately from the principal, and the latter was alleged to have been “convicted by a jury.” The question was whether that was a sufficient allegation of conviction to support t…
-
Ex Parte, 86 Fla. 145 (Fla. 1923)…employed in this connection, seems to comprehend an adjudication of guilt by the court and not simply a verdict of a jury. The distinction is recognized by this court. State ex rel. Owens v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 South. Rep. 560; Daughtry v. State, 46 Fla. 109, 35 South. Rep. 397, 110 Am. St. Rep. 84. In this case the court had not, at the time petitioner was committed to jail, adjudged him guilty. It may be that upon consideration of this motion the verdict will be set aside and a new trial awarded, in w…
-
Kauz v. State, 98 Fla. 687 (Fla. 1929)…n v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 So., R. 459. “Conviction” of the principal as here used means not merely a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty by a jury but contemplates an adjudication of guilt by a court of competent jurisdiction. Dougherty v. State, 46 Fla. 109, 35 So. R. 397; 110 [*692] Am. St. R. 84; Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. R. 834. When arraigned upon this joint information, the two principals pleaded guilty. Plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty. A severance was granted, and plaint…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ex-parte Mack Bowen, 25 Fla. 214 (Fla. 1889)
- Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645 (Fla. 1889)