ULISES TAMAYO, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, ULISES TAMAYO AND ROSARIO ESTEVEZ AND ULISES TAMAYO AND ROSARIO ESTEVEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
MIAMI CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1987-09-01
Nos. 86-877, 87-370
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.
511 So. 2d 1091 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

In this medical malpractice appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's limitation of attorney's fees to the contingent fee agreement amount, holding that the Rowe decision limiting court-awarded fees to contractual fee arrangements does not apply retroactively to fee agreements entered before Rowe's effective date.


Holding

The Rowe decision does not apply retroactively to restrict court-awarded attorney's fees to the contingent fee agreement amount where the fee agreement was entered into prior to Rowe's effective date. Therefore, court-awarded fees may exceed the fee set by the contingency fee agreement under these circumstances.


Headnotes

[1] A court-awarded attorney's fee may exceed the fee set by a contingency fee agreement when the agreement was entered into prior to the effective date of Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. …

[2] The rule that a court-awarded attorney's fee should not exceed the fee arrangement between the attorney and client does not apply retroactively to fee agreements executed…

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Key Quotes

“Further, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee arrangement reached by the attorney and his client.”

The Rowe rule that the trial court applied to limit attorney's fees to the contingent fee agreement amount

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs Ulises Tamayo (a minor) and his parents were the prevailing parties in a medical malpractice action against Miami Children's Hospital. The …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a trial court order awarding them attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1983) as the prevailing parties in a medical malpractice action. The trial court limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the amount of the contingent fee payable under the contract between the plaintiffs and their counsel, based on the authority of Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985) (“Further, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee arrangement reached by the attorney and his client.”)

We reverse and remand for further proceedings based on the rule in this district that Rowe does not apply retroactively so as to restrict an attorney’s fee award to be no more than the fee set by the contingency fee agreement between the party seeking fees and his counsel, where, as here, the said attorney’s fee agreement was entered into prior to the effective date of the Rowe decision. Tuerk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1987); Levy v. Levy, 483 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1333 (Fla.1986). We nonetheless certify that our decision passes upon a question of great public importance, namely, whether the above-stated interpretation of Rowe is a proper and valid interpretation of the Rowe decision, so as to permit further review of this case by the Florida Supreme Court under Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.

The attorney’s fee order under review is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an attorney’s fee award based on the standards established by Rowe, except that the court-awarded fee may exceed the fee set by the contingency fee agreement between the plaintiff and his counsel.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1990)
    …ation. Subsequently, the trial court reversed itself based on a Third District holding that Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), could not be applied retroactively. Tamayo ex rel. Tamayo v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 511 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), quashed, 529 So. 2d 667 (FIa.1988). . Even if Quanstrom applied, however, we would conclude that the case below involved a matter properly the subject of the lodestar formula. A shareholder’s derivative suit of the type prosecut…
  • Miami Child's. Hosp. v. Ulises Tamayo, 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1988)
    …OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review Tamayo v. Miami Children’s Hospital, 511 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified that its decision passed on a question of great public importance. We rephrase the question as follows: When addressing an attorney’s fee award under section 768.56, Florida…
  • Eleanor v. Bodiford, 524 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …restrict an attorney’s fee award to be no more than the fee set by the contingency fee agreement... where ... the said attorney’s fee agreement was entered into prior to the effective date of the Rowe decision.” Tamayo v. Miami Children’s Hospital, 511 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Tuerk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1987); Levy v. Levy, 483 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1333 (Fla.1986). The record here shows that ap…

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