PHILLIP R. WASSERMAN AND CONTINENTAL-HEALTH INSURANCE, INC., APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
GULF HEALTH, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, D/B/A FLORIDA CO-OP INSURANCE SERVICES AND FURTHER D/B/A GHL FINANCIAL, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Wasserman and Continental-Health Insurance appealed a contempt finding against them, while Gulf Health cross-appealed the denial of motions to dissolve temporary injunctions. The court affirmed the contempt order but reversed and remanded regarding the injunctions, finding them defective for failing to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(a) and lacking adequate bond requirements.
The court affirmed the contempt finding against appellants on all six points raised. The court reversed the denial of the motions to dissolve the temporary injunctions, finding them facially defective for failure to comply with Rule 1.610(a) requirements and failure to meet the bond requirements of Rule 1.610(b), as a $1.00 bond is grossly inadequate and fails to satisfy the purpose of the bond requirement.
[1] Temporary injunctions must state findings by the court explaining why the injury may be irreparable and the reasons for entry without notice.
[2] A temporary injunction must include a date of entry to be facially valid.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Of the two besieged orders, one fails to show a date of entry; and both fail to define the injury, fail to state findings by the court why the injury may be irreparable and fail to state reasons why they were entered without notice.”
Establishes the facial defects of the temporary injunctions violating Rule 1.610(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered an order on June 25, 1986 finding appellants in willful contempt. Appellee Gulf Health sought to dissolve two temporary injunc…
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RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial court on June 25, 1986 finding appellants in willful contempt. Appellants raise six points on appeal. We find merit in none. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order. Appellee cross-appeals the denial of its motions to dissolve two temporary injunctions. The first motion to dissolve was served on April 17, 1986 and alleges, inter alia, that the temporary injunctions are defective on their face. The second motion to dissolve was served June 26, 1986 and argues fatal defectiveness in a conclusory fashion. Cross-appellants’ first point on appeal is that the two temporary injunctions are defective upon their face and should be dissolved. We agree.
Of the two besieged orders, one fails to show a date of entry; and both fail to define the injury, fail to state findings by the court why the injury may be irrepa- rabie and fail to state reasons why they were entered without notice. The orders, therefore, run afoul of the standards required in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(a). See County of Orange v. Webster, 503 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Conway Meats, Inc. v. Orange Ave. Partnership, 440 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We reverse the trial court’s denial of cross-appellant’s first motion to dissolve.
Even if the trial court would have complied with the above substantive requirements, we would have another, independent ground for reversing the trial court’s denial of cross-appellant’s motion to dissolve. Subsection (b) of rule 1.610 requires the posting of a bond by the movant upon entry of a temporary injunction. One of the injunctions here did not require a bond; the other required a mere $1.00 bond. A $1.00 bond for a temporary injunction has been found to be “grossly inadequate” by the fourth district. Minimatic Components, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 494 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The first district has stated “[t]he fixing of a bond of $1.00 was making a farce of the Rule [1.610] and the law should not be made a mockery of in its application.” Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 314 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We follow our sister courts in holding that the purpose of the bond requirement in rule 1.610(b) is not met by the posting of a nominal bond.
We reverse and set aside the trial court’s denial of appellee/cross-appellant’s first motion to dissolve the temporary injunctions and remand with instructions to the trial court that it enter an order granting appellee’s motion to dissolve.
We note that cross-appellant argues in its reply brief that “as a direct result of the issuance of the injunctions in this case, the court has sealed the entire court file.” The order sealing the file was not raised as error in this appeal, and it if it had been we do not have sufficient record to render a decision as to its propriety. We do note, however, that if the order sealing the record was based solely on the two temporary injunctions, then the order’s foundation has been taken from it.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Wolfgang Bellach v. Huggs OF Naples, Inc., 704 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…Rather than relinquish jurisdiction under these circumstances, we reverse the trial court’s order. The injunction is defective because Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b) requires the movant to post a bond. See Wasserman v. Gulf Health, Inc., 512 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1987). The trial court cannot waive this requirement nor can it comply by setting a nominal amount. Id. The trial court must set the bond after providing both parties with the opportunity to pr…
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Pecora v. Pecora, 697 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…y cases we have found that even mention this requirement noted the omission of the hour and date as among a series of deficiencies in appealed orders. See, e.g., Dejong v. Dejong, 572 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Wasserman v. Gulf Health, Inc., 512 So. 2d 234, 234-35 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1987); Torok v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Owners Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The historical development of Rule 1.610 reveals that the hour and date requirements were introd…
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Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Cletus Cozart and Patricia Cozart, 561 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…he amount of a bond is typically a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion, we reverse the trial court’s refusal to increase this nominal bond because it is tantamount to no bond under the facts of this case. Wasserman v. Gulf Health, Inc., 512 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1987). The appellants own and operate a shopping mall adjacent to Mr. and Mrs. Cozarts’ trailer park.1 The mall was constructed with 600,000-gallon underground holding tanks to collect rain water a…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Minimatic Components, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 494 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Cnty. OF Orange v. Webster, 503 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Conway Meats, Inc. v. Orange Ave. P'ship, 440 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Rowe v. State, 314 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Marston v. Gainesville SUN Publ'g Co., Inc., 314 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)