THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BIENVENIDO CONTRARAS, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's suppression of evidence seized from defendant Contraras following a warrantless stop. The appellate court affirmed the suppression, holding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, relying instead on a drug-trafficking profile composed of innocent acts.
The court held that using a pay telephone, bowling, driving to a beauty salon, stopping at a house, and leaving with a bag are not specific and articulable facts warranting an investigatory stop. The innocent acts comprising the defendant's profile do not justify official intrusion absent reasonable suspicion.
[1] A police stop is unlawful if based solely on a "hunch" not supported by specific and articulable facts indicating criminal activity.
[2] Actions such as using a pay telephone, bowling, driving to a salon, stopping at a house, and leaving with a bag do not, in themselves, constitute reasonable suspicion for…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the actions of the officers in stopping the Defendant were done for the purpose of searching the bag and its contents. The officers intended to search the bag even though they did not have probable cause to conduct such search.”
Establishes that the stop was pretextual, aimed at conducting a search without probable cause.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficers stopped defendant Contraras based on his profile of behavior, which included using a pay telephone, bowling in a bowling alley, driving to a …
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BASKIN, Judge.
Granting a defense motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant Contraras, the trial court found:
[T]he actions of the officers in stopping the Defendant were done for the purpose of searching the bag and its contents. The officers intended to search the bag even though they did not have probable cause to conduct such search. Moreover, the Court finds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe the Defendant was engaged in illegal activity, and they were acting on a mere hunch. The hunch of the officers was not based upon an articulable reasonable suspicion which was based on particular actions of the Defendant or the circumstances. Instead, the stop was based upon the fact the Defendant did certain innocent acts which fit within a “profile” of innocent acts which are consistent with drug traffickers as well as innocent persons. The innocent acts of the Defendant do not in and of themselves give rise to an articulable and objective reasonable suspicion.
We agree with the trial court that the facts under consideration do not warrant official intrusion. Using a pay telephone, bowling in a bowling alley, driving to a beauty salon, stopping at a nearby house, and leaving that residence with a bag are not “specific and articulable” facts which would justify stopping defendant Contrar-as. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). We therefore affirm the Order Granting Motion to Suppress. See Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1977); Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Kayes v. State, 409 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), review denied, 424 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1982).
Affirmed.
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Hernan Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ve away in his own car. Defendant’s actions do not give rise to a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1977); State v. Contraras, 512 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and the unlawful stop tainted the subsequent search. Here, however, unlike Alberty, the taint of the unlawful search was dissipated by the ensuing proceedings. “Any taint which may arise from even an unlawful prior seizure of the…
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Diaz v. State, 548 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…az’ vehicle under the standards set forth in Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1095-96 (Fla.1988). The circumstances observed by the officers are, in our view, different from those involved in the decisions relied on by appellant, State v. Contraras, 512 So. 2d 339 (Fla.3d DCA 1987); and Alberty v. State, 536 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). That issue is not dispositive here, however. Whether or not the detectives had a founded suspicion, once the detectives had activated their blue emergency lights, Diaz was…
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Alberty v. State, 536 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…itimizing the stop. Talking on a pay telephone, driving a passenger to his destination, eating at Burger King, and stopping for a car wash are not unlawful activities sufficient to justify a founded suspicion of criminal conduct. State v. Contraras, 512 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). When the officers saw the cocaine in plain view, arrested defendants, and advised them of their rights, their activities were already tainted by the unlawful stop. See Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1980); Bailey v. State,…
Authorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- LaMarcus Edward Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1977)
- Kayes v. State, 409 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)