URSULA K. HOBART, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD A. HOBART, APPELLEE
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Ursula Hobart appealed a divorce judgment in which the trial court awarded her $5,000 in lump sum rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent alimony. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding rehabilitative alimony without evidence that the award would enable her to become self-supporting.
The court reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony, holding that it was error to award rehabilitative alimony without evidence establishing that Mrs. Hobart was capable of employment and had potential capacity for self-support. The court remanded for a factual determination regarding whether permanent and/or rehabilitative alimony should be awarded.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where the evidence suggests a spouse can be raised to a financial stature that would permit them to become self-supporting.
[2] An award of rehabilitative alimony is erroneous if there is no evidence that the awarded amount will bring the recipient to a level of self-sufficiency.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rehabilitative alimony presupposes a potential for self-support that has been undeveloped or completely lost during the marriage.”
Establishes the legal requirement for rehabilitative alimony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUrsula Hobart, born in Germany with a ninth-grade education, married Donald Hobart in 1975 after a prior divorce. The couple was married for 11 years …
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant, Ursula K. Hobart, appeals from a final judgment in which the trial court dissolved her marriage and refused her permanent alimony. Hobart raises two issues in her appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony; (2) whether she was entitled to an award of permanent alimony. Our resolution of the first issue makes it unnecessary for us to reach the second. We reverse.
Mrs. Hobart was born in Germany and married her first husband, an American, there in 1955. Her first marriage produced three children. Mrs. Hobart and her husband came to the United States to live but were divorced in 1973. Appellee, Mr. Hobart, married Mrs. Hobart in Memphis, Tennessee, in April of 1975. Mr. Hobart worked as an FAA Controller in Memphis and did military reserve duty there. He has now retired from both positions. Like Mrs. Hobart, Mr. Hobart had had a previous marriage before the couple met.
In 1977, Mr. Hobart sold his home in Memphis and he and Mrs. Hobart moved to Destín, Florida. Mr. Hobart concedes that at the time of their marriage, he had significant assets in cash, stocks, and real property. At the time the trial court granted the final judgment, Mr. and Mrs. Hobart had been married for eleven years and four months.
Mrs. Hobart did not work during her marriage to Mr. Hobart, but there is contradictory evidence as to whether this was a matter of her own choice or because her husband prevented her from seeking employment. Mrs. Hobart was 49 years of age when her marriage to Mr. Hobart was terminated. She has a ninth grade German education.
On August 29, 1986, the trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the Ho-barts’ marriage. The court refused Mrs. Hobart’s request for permanent periodic alimony and granted her lump sum rehabilitative alimony of $5,000. From the trial court’s final judgment, Mrs. Hobart appeals.
We find that the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Hobart rehabilitative alimony. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the $5,000 which the trial court awarded Mrs. Hobart will bring her to any level of self-sufficiency. Rehabilitative alimony presupposes a potential for self-support that has been undeveloped or completely lost during the marriage. Holland v. Holland, 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Atkins v. Atkins, 380 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where the evidence suggests the wife can be raised to a financial stature that would permit her to become self-supporting. Allison v. Allison, 491 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citing Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).
In Evans v. Evans, 507 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), this court held that where there is no evidence that a wife’s employment potential would be any greater in the future than it was at the time of a final judgment of dissolution, it is error to award rehabilitative alimony. Accordingly, because there was no evidence adduced to establish both that Mrs. Hobart was capable of employment and that she had the potential capacity for self-support, the trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony. We therefore remand this cause to the trial court to make a factual determination as to whether Mrs. Hobart should have permanent and/or rehabilitative alimony, and if so, how much. The trial court is authorized to take additional testimony.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
NIMMONS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Carr v. Carr, 522 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…self-support that has been underdeveloped or completely lost during the marriage,” and “is appropriate only where the evidence suggests the wife can be raised to a financial stature that would permit her to become self-supporting.” Hobart v. Hobart, 512 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). See also, Holcomb v. Holcomb, 505 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 508 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); and Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). We are fully cognizant of the evidence…
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Hurwit v. Handre Hurwit, 537 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…lberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (quoting Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and “presupposes a potential for self-support that has been underdeveloped or completely lost during the marriage.” Hobart v. Hobart, 512 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), review denied, 519 So. 2d 987 (Fla.1988). In the case before us, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony demonstrates its belief that appellant has the capacity for self-support and the need for training; however,…
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Hatcher v. Hatcher, 533 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife only temporary rehabilitative alimony. [*919] Rehabilitative alimony presupposes a potential for self-support that has been undeveloped or completely lost during the marriage.” Hobart v. Hobart, 512 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Furthermore, “rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where the evidence suggests the wife can be raised to a financial stature that would permit her to become self-supporting.” Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 198…
Authorities Cited
- Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Chiyo Allison v. Allison, 491 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Holland v. Holland, 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Evans v. Evans, 507 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Hagood v. State, 380 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Atkins v. Atkins, 380 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)