STERLING ALBERT MURPHY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1987-08-26
No. 4-86-2317
LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
512 So. 2d 1006 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1987) Negative Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

This case reviews the denial of a motion to suppress evidence found in a vehicle. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the initial stop of the defendant was lawful and that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his car.


Holding

The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The court found that the initial stop was justified by articulable suspicion and that the defendant's consent to search was voluntary.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer may lawfully stop an individual when there is articulable and founded suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity.

[2] A search of a vehicle is lawful when the owner voluntarily consents to the search.

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Key Quotes

“Based upon the totality of the circumstances I find yes. it was a stop within the scope of Terry vs. Ohio and it was yes to that. There was a legal right to stop the Defendant under the provisions of 901.151 and Terry vs. Ohio.”

Establishes the court's finding that the initial stop of the defendant was lawful.

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Facts & Procedural History

Police observed a car parked in a high-drug-trafficking area with a person in the window who fled when approached. The defendant was found in the car,…

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Opinion of the Court
STONE, Judge.

STONE, Judge.

The defendant entered a no contest plea to charges of possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, reserving the opportunity to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, where the evidence he sought to suppress was found. The trial court made the following findings:

THE COURT: I will read into the record briefly the facts from the evidence.

The evidence is composed of the testimony of three witnesses. The Court in making the findings of fact does have to make some determinations of credibility and weight to be given to the testimony. I have observed the three witnesses while testifying, have considered those factors which are legally required to be considered in making determinations of weight and credibility. Based upon the evidence then I make the following findings of fact.

On April 2, 1986, while on patrol at approximately one ten a.m. Officer Miller of City of Okeechobee Police Department saw a 1978 Buick Riviera automobile parked in front of the Two Stop Bar in the City of Okeechobee, which is an area which is known for drug dealing. Drug sales, illicit drug sales. The Two Stop Bar was closed at that time. Officer Miller is an officer of some five years of experience as a police officer. He has had experience as an undercover officer buying illicit drugs; he has engaged in some twenty drug buys and arrests therefrom. The Buick Riviera was parked legally in front of the Two Stop Bar. Officer Miller observed no other vehicles in the area although there may have bene [sic] other vehicles in the area. He noted that the Riviera was a car which was not necessarily consistent with the socio-economics of the area, in his opinion was a nicer car than was normally seen in that area. As he drove near he did notice a person described as a black male wearing a red raincoat, in his words hanging in the window of the Buick. Officer Miller drove in the direction of the black male who was wearing the red raincoat who first walked away from him then started running, ran into the woods which were nearby as Officer Miller followed in his car so Officer Miller turned around and returned to the Buick automobile. Went to the window of the Buick and observed the Defendant in this case who appeared to be shaking, appeared to be nervous, asked for the Defendant’s driver's license, which Mr. Murphy did give him; Mr.— Officer Miller then went back to his patrol unit and checked Mr. Murphy’s driver’s license. Approximately at this time Officer Emmins arrived pursuant to a call that Officer Miller had made when he exited his car to talk with the Defendant. Mr. Miller told Mr. Emmins that he suspected mr. [sic] Murphy of being involved in some type of drug related offense; stated that he wanted to look in Mr. Murphy’s car because of the circumstances that he had observed and he outlined those circumstances to Officer Em-mins; Officer Emmins is an officer of some 3½ years experience as a police officer involved in between 40 — 50 arrests for cocaine violations. Officer Em-mins then asked Mr. Murphy if it was all right to search Mr. Murphy’s car; Mr. Murphy immediately responded yes. officer [sic] Emmins sensing that the answer was too quick advised Mr. Murphy that he did not have to consent to the search; however, Mr. Murphy said yes he did want to go ahead and allow the search. Mr. Miller then told Mr. Murphy that he suspected that Mr. Murphy had been buying or selling cocaine. The two officers then did search the automobile. During the course of the search items of contraband were found concealed in the car. Cocaine rocks and cocaine heaters. Based thereon Mr. Murphy was arrested. Later the substance was field tested and field .tested positive for cocaine. On other occasions Officer Emmins has watched persons who are suspected of drug deals run into these same woods and drop the cocaine in the woods on their way running through the woods. Based upon these facts there are basically three legal questions the Court must answer.

First, the propriety of the stop of Mr. Murphy, that is, was the stop within the stop and frisk law, Florida Section 901.151 and Terry vs. Ohio. The components of that first was there articulable and founded suspicion that would justify the stop. Based upon the totality of the circumstances I find yes. it [sic] was a stop within the scope of Terry vs. Ohio and it was yes to that. There was a legal right to stop the Defendant under the provisions of 901.151 and Terry vs. Ohio. Was there a consent to search the vehicle? Yes. Was there probable cause to arrest the Defendant? Yes.

The Motion to Suppress Tangible Exhibits is denied.

The trial court did not err in concluding that Murphy was lawfully detained. Cf. Tamer v. State, 484 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1986); State v. Kehoe, 498 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Berry v. State, 493 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State v. Smith, 477 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). There is no conflict with Kearse v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), because the totality of the circumstances differs in the instant case.

Moreover, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Murphy voluntarily consented to the search in question. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Unlike the defendant in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the defendant in this case was not being unlawfully detained at the time of the disputed consent. We therefore affirm.

LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
    …GLICKSTEIN, Judge, concurring. This case may serve as a brake on what may be an unhealthy trend in narcotics stop cases. In retrospect, Murphy v. State, 512 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), appears to walk on thin constitutional ice. More important, Murphy offers a potential for use in support of erosion of fourth amendment protections.…
  • State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …0, 761 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Based upon the totality of the circumstances presented by an experienced law enforcement officer, the state has shown a founded suspicion for the stop. Batie v. State, 593 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Murphy v. State, 512 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1988). I realize that several of our sister courts have reached different conclusions concerning this type of behavior and how it can be characterized. The majority opinion has listed several…
  • Elliott v. State, 597 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …se founded suspicion. . See also State v. Isaacs, 578 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Ewen v. State, 518 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 528 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1988); Murphy v. State, 512 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1988).…

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