PRESTON WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Preston Williams was convicted of burglary and trafficking in cocaine based largely on informant testimony. The court reversed his convictions because the trial court failed to conduct a proper inquiry into a Brady violation—the state's nondisclosure that the informant had a plea bargain providing motivation to testify—and remanded for a new trial.
The trial court's failure to conduct a proper Richardson hearing to inquire into whether the state's violation was inadvertent or willful, trivial or substantial, and what effect it had on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial is reversible error not subject to harmless error analysis, requiring reversal of Williams' convictions and remand for new trial.
[1] A trial court must conduct a proper inquiry into the nature and effect of a discovery violation, including whether the violation was inadvertent or willful, trivial or su…
[2] A trial court's failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into a discovery violation is not subject to harmless error analysis and mandates reversal of convictions.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“whether the state's violation was inadvertent or wilful, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and most importantly, what effect, if any, ... it [had] upon the ability of the defendant to properly prepare for trial.”
Establishes the required Richardson inquiry factors that the trial court must examine when a discovery violation is raised.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was prosecuted for burglary and trafficking in cocaine, with the state relying primarily on an informant's testimony. Williams sought to impe…
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NESBITT, Judge.
Upon the state’s motion for rehearing, we withdraw and vacate our previous panel opinion, but again reverse the convictions under review.
Williams contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this case or grant a new trial based upon a discovery violation committed by the state. Because the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry into the nature and effect of the discovery violation, we are constrained to reverse William’s convictions for burglary and trafficking in cocaine, and remand for a new trial.
The state relied primarily upon the testimony of an informant to convict Williams. Williams attempted to impeach the credibility of the informant by establishing that the informant was motivated to testify by the state’s promise of a lighter sentence for crimes the informant had committed. The state denied that any such bargain had been struck with the informant, and contended that the informant had no obvious reason to lie.
During the trial, information was revealed which tended to confirm Williams’ assertion that the informant was motivated to testify by a plea bargain. The nature of the information also suggested that the state had been aware of this but had failed to disclose the fact despite its obligations under the rules of discovery.
Williams made a motion before the trial court, based upon Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), for this violation to be cured. Once this violation was brought to the attention of the trial court it was incumbent upon the court to conduct an inquiry into the surrounding circumstances of the violation, including “whether the state’s violation was inadvertent or wilful, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and most importantly, what effect, if any, ... it [had] upon the ability of the defendant to properly prepare for trial.” Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla.1971) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)); McDonnough v. State, 402 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); see also Gant v. State, 477 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Although the trial judge noted that this was one of the most flagrant Brady violations he had ever seen, the trial judge refused to grant the defendant’s motion for dismissal and failed to conduct a proper Richardson hearing. While we recognize the trial court’s discretionary authority to determine the prejudice resulting from a discovery violation, such authority may “be properly exercised only after the court has made an adequate inquiry.” Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 775 (quoting Ramirez, 241 So. 2d at 747).
The state suggests that we remand this case to the trial court for a determination of whether the discovery violation had a prejudicial effect upon Williams. Such a post-trial Richardson hearing was expressly rejected by our supreme court in Smith v. State, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla.1979), as an unsatisfactory substitute for a proper hearing during trial. Accord Poe v. State, 431 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
The trial court’s failure to conduct a proper inquiry pursuant to Richardson is not subject to the harmless error rule and requires that we reverse Williams’s convictions without further review of the record. Smith v. State, 500 So. 2d 125 (Fla.1986); Cumbie v. State, 345 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1977); R.R. v. State, 476 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 502 So. 2d 1244 (Fla.1987); Alfaro v. State, 471 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla.1986). Consequently, we need not reach any of the other points raised in this appeal. Accordingly, the judgments under review are Reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial. In all other respects, the state’s motion for rehearing is denied.
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In the Interest of F.R., 539 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…n inquiry would be required when “it is brought to the attention of the trial court” that a discovery request has not been met. Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 775, quoting Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). See also, Williams v. State, 513 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 523 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1988) (trial court erred in not holding Richardson hearing when it learned through a motion alleging a Brady violation that the state failed to disclose information requested in discovery), and Mi…
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Brown v. State, 640 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…idence so that it is brought to the attention of the trial court, no magic words exist to trigger the requirement that the trial court conduct a Richardson hearing. Richardson; Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Williams v. State, 513 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 523 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1988); Miller v. State, 403 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Waiver occurs only if the defendant fails to object to the discovery violation. See, e.g., Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla.1979); T…
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Cliff Berry, Inc. v. State, 116 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…timony was sufficient to bring the possible discovery violation to the trial court’s attention and to trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a Richardson inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the discovery violation.22 See Williams v. State, 513 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding trial court erred when it failed to conduct a Richardson inquiry after learning, through a motion alleging a Brady violation, that the state failed to disclose information requested in discovery); see also State v. Evans,…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963)
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- Cumbie v. State, 345 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1977)
- Smith v. State, 500 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1986)
- Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Smith v. State, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979)
- Bradford Glenn McDONNOUGH v. State, 402 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- R.R. v. State, 476 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Margarito Alfaro v. State, 471 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)