MELISSA HENRIQUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Henriquez was convicted of petit theft (not armed robbery as charged) and sentenced to consecutive jail terms plus fines, court costs, and a public defender lien. She appealed arguing insufficient evidence and that procedural safeguards required by Jenkins v. State were not followed, but the court affirmed, finding that her failure to object at sentencing constituted a waiver.
The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The failure to object when the trial judge orally announced his intention to impose the assessments at sentencing constituted a waiver of the right to raise procedural objections to those assessments on appeal, including Jenkins violations.
[1] A defendant waives the right to object to the imposition of fines, court costs, and public defender liens by failing to object when the trial court orally states its inte…
[2] Failure to object to the oral pronouncement of fines, court costs, and public defender liens at sentencing waives the right to assert objections on appeal, including obje…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The failure to object when the trial judge orally stated his intention to impose these assessments constituted a waiver of the right to assert objections to the assessments on appeal, including the objection that the procedural requirements of Jenkins v. State were not followed.”
Establishes the core holding that failure to object at sentencing waives appellate review of procedural defects in imposing fines and costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHenriquez was tried on three counts of armed robbery but the jury convicted her of three counts of petit theft instead. She was sentenced to three con…
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DANAHY, Chief Judge.
The appellant went to trial on three charges of armed robbery. The jury found her guilty of three counts of petit theft and she was sentenced to three consecutive terms in the county jail of sixty days each. At sentencing, the trial judge stated his intention to impose a fine with respect to each count, court costs, and a lien for the services of the public defender. The public defender suggested to the trial judge an appropriate amount for his services, and that was the amount imposed. There was no objection by the defendant to the assessment of any of these items.
On this appeal, the appellant argues first that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We find no merit in that argument. The appellant’s second issue suggests that the imposition of a fine, court costs, and public defender’s lien was improper because there was no notice and hearing with respect to these items as required by Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984), and no determination was made as to the appellant's ability to pay. We reject this argument also.
Recently we considered a case in which the trial judge did not pronounce the impo sition of any costs at the sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, the written judgment in that case imposed court costs under various statutes. We held that since the trial judge made no mention of costs during the sentencing hearing, but later imposed them in his written judgment, the trial judge erred by not comporting with the procedural safeguards in Jenkins v. State. Sescon v. State, 506 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
In the present case, the trial judge clearly stated at the sentencing hearing his intention to impose fines, costs, and a lien for the services of the public defender. The amount of that lien was suggested by the public defender himself. We hold that the failure to object when the trial judge orally stated his intention to impose these assessments constituted a waiver of the right to assert objections to the assessments on appeal, including the objection that the procedural requirements of Jenkins v. State were not followed. We acknowledge that our holding in this respect conflicts with the decision of our sister court in Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
Accordingly, we affirm both the convictions and sentences in this case.
RYDER * and FRANK, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Henriquez v. State, 545 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1989)…PER CURIAM. Melissa Henriquez petitions this Court to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Henriquez v. State, 513 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). As the second district court acknowledged, its holding is in direct and express conflict with Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Henriquez, 513 So. 2d at 1286. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const…
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Barker v. State, 518 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…rally stated his intention to impose assessments constituted a waiver of the right to assert objections to the assessments on appeal, including the objection that the procedural requirements of Jenkins v. State were not followed. Henriquez v. State, 513 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Notwithstanding, the issue continues to be a troubling one. We acknowledged in Henriquez that our holding there was in conflict with the holding in Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), which declared that failure…
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Darrin Bartholemew Hamm v. State, 521 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ts were orally imposed, the trial court failed to provide statutory authority for any of the costs. The appellant, therefore, had no real opportunity to object to the costs as would normally be required by this court’s holding in Henriquez v. State, 513 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We, accordingly, strike these costs. See Brown v. State, 506 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 515 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1987). Should the trial court decide to again impose costs, it must cite proper statutory aut…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Sescon v. State, 506 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)