DAVID SEITLIN, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANKLIN B. BYSTROM, AS PROPERTY APPRAISER OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA AND FRED GANZ, AS ACTING TAX COLLECTOR OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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This case addresses the critical procedural question of when the 60-day statutory deadline begins for challenging a property assessment decision by the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board in Florida. The court holds that the deadline runs from the date on the notice of the board's decision, not from when the board actually met and rendered its decision.
The court holds that the 60-day deadline commences from the date contained on the notice of the board's action, not from when the board met and made its determination. Therefore, Seitlin's timely filing within 60 days of the notice date was proper, even though it exceeded 60 days from the board meeting.
[1] The time for seeking court review of a Property Appraisal Adjustment Board's action commences from the date on the notice advising the taxpayer of the board's action.
[2] A taxpayer's challenge to a property assessment is timely if filed within 60 days of the date on the notice of the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board's action, even if b…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that the time commences to run for purposes of seeking court review of the action of the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board from the date contained on the notice which advises the taxpayer of the action of the board.”
States the core holding regarding when the 60-day deadline begins
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeitlin, as trustee, sought court review of a property assessment decision made by the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board in Dade County, Florida. Th…
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PER CURIAM.
We hold that the time commences to run for purposes of seeking court review of the action of the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board from the date contained on the notice which advises the taxpayer of the action of the board.1 Therefore, the taxpayer’s attack on the assessment, as approved by the board, filed within 60 days of the date on the notice of the board’s action was timely, although beyond 60 days from when the board met and made its determination, which was later reduced to writing. Therefore, the summary judgment holding that the time commenced from the date of the board’s meeting and not the date contained on the notice of the board’s action is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL, HENDRY, HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN, and DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ. ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM.
Following review of the motion for rehearing en banc the court considered the following per curiam affirmed opinions, Sckild v. Metropolitan Dade County, 498 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Tumberry Towers Corp. v. Bystrom, 496 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom, 496 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); and the case of Bystrom v. Stone, 498 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) which the county contends are opposite to the panel opinion in this cause. In order to clarify the matter, we recede from the aforementioned cases and adopt the panel opinion.
. Section 194.034(2), Florida Statutes (1985):
194.034 Hearing procedures; rules.
(2) In each case, except when a complaint is withdrawn by the petitioner or is acknowledged as correct by the property appraiser, the property appraisal adjustment board shall render a written decision. All such decisions shall be issued within 20 calendar days of the last day the board is in session under s. 194.032. The decision of the board shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall include reasons for upholding or overturning the determination of the property appraiser. When a special master has been appointed, the recommendations of the special master shall be considered by the board. The clerk, upon issuance of the decisions, shall, on a form provided by the Department of Revenue, notify by first-class mail each taxpayer, the property appraiser, and the department of the decision of the board. (Emphasis added.)
Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1985):
194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases.
(2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s. 193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the property appraisal adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the property appraisal adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s. 197.323. (Emphasis added.)
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. DAY, 742 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…, the mailing date indicated on the VAB’s written notice of decision does not act to extend the running of the 60-day time period from the date of certification. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those presented in Seitlin v. Bystrom, 514 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 523 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1988). There, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the 60-day time period commenced to run for purposes of seeking review of the VAB’s denial of the taxpayer’s petition from the date con…
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Timothy "Pete" Smith v. Kyle, 4 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…PER CURIAM. DENIED. Walker v. Garrison, 610 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Seitlin v. Bystrom, 514 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). BARFIELD, VAN NORTWICK, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Schild v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 498 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Valencia Ctr., Inc. v. Bystrom, 496 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)