BOBBY MARION FRANCIS, PETITIONER,
v.
RICHARD L. DUGGER, RESPONDENT
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Bobby Marion Francis, under a death sentence, petitioned for habeas corpus relief and a stay of execution, arguing that the imposition of the death penalty contrary to the jury's recommendation violated his rights. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition, finding the issue procedurally barred and rejecting his arguments that recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent required reconsideration of his sentence.
The Florida Supreme Court held that Francis's claim was procedurally barred because it had been fully argued and decided adversely to him on direct appeal. The Court also held that Skipper and Valle did not effect a fundamental change in Florida law requiring reconsideration, as Florida courts had already recognized that being a model prisoner is a mitigating factor prior to Skipper.
[1] A claim that the death penalty was imposed contrary to a jury's recommendation is procedurally barred in a habeas corpus petition if it was fully argued and decided adver…
[2] A prior appellate decision on direct appeal is not rendered erroneous by a subsequent Supreme Court decision if the state court had already recognized the issue as a miti…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find the issue procedurally barred, since it was fully argued and decided adversely to Francis on direct appeal.”
Establishes that the habeas petition's central claim cannot be relitigated because it was already decided on direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBobby Marion Francis was sentenced to death. At trial, the jury apparently recommended against the death penalty, but the trial court imposed it anywa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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BARKETT, Justice.
Bobby Marion Francis, under sentence of death and the governor’s death warrant, petitions this Court for extraordinary relief, writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (7) & (9), Fla. Const. We deny the requested relief.
The facts of this case are set forth in Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175, 1178-79 (Fla.1982), and Francis v. State, 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 870, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986).
As his single issue in the instant petition, Francis argues that the imposition of the death penalty contrary to the jury’s recommendation at trial entitles him to ha-beas relief. We find the issue procedurally barred, since it was fully argued and decided adversely to Francis on direct appeal. Moreover, the record is clear that the trial court in its sentencing order explicitly considered the mitigating evidence that petitioner was a model prisoner. Nor can we agree, as petitioner contends, that Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), ef fected a fundamental change in Florida law. Petitioner argues that Skipper in effect required this Court for the first time to recognize in mitigation the fact that a petitioner has been a model prisoner. Based on this assertion, petitioner argues that our decision on direct appeal, which preceded Skipper, necessarily was grounded in erroneous law. We cannot agree. In McCampbell v. State, 421 So. 2d 1072, 1075-76 (Fla.1982), some four years earlier, we explicitly had endorsed as a mitigating factor “appellant’s prior record as a model prisoner.”
Petitioner’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s remand in Valle v. Florida, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986) (citing Skipper), is misplaced. That decision vacated our opinion in Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla.1985), in which we had allowed the exclusion of expert testimony about a prisoner’s future capacity to be a model prisoner. We had found this evidence merely cumulative because petitioner already had presented lay testimony that he in fact had the reputation of presently being a model prisoner. Valle thus was in accord with McCampbell.
Read in tandem, Skipper and Valle v. Florida thus stand only for the proposition that a probability of future good behavior in prison as established in expert testimony is a mitigating factor distinct from that of presently being a model prisoner, and that we erred in holding otherwise. See Valle v. State, 502 So. 2d 1225 (Fla.1987) (on remand). The instant case does not involve expert testimony establishing a probability of future good behavior in prison. Valle v. Florida thus has no bearing on the issues at hand.
We deny the requested relief. No petition for rehearing will be entertained.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990)…as improved markedly since the crime occurred. We have held the potential for rehabilitation to be a valid mitigating circumstance. Brown, 526 So. 2d at 908 (“The potential for rehabilitation constitutes a valid mitigating factor. Francis v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla.1987); Valle v. State, 502 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla.1987).”); see also Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla.1989) (mitigation found in, among other things, unrebutted evidence that defendant’s reasoning abilities were substantiall…
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Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1988)…as substantially impaired.13 Additionally, there was testimony that appellant was not a vicious or predatory-type criminal and rehabilitation thus was likely. The potential for rehabilitation constitutes a valid mitigating factor. Francis v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla.1987); Valle v. State, 502 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla.1987). We point out that the trial judge was incorrect in concluding that appellant’s “disadvantaged childhood, his abusive parents, and his lack of education and training, do not establi…
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Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991)…peal. Francis v. State, 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 870, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986). After the governor signed Francis’ first death [*584] warrant, we denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Francis v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.1987), and affirmed the trial court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief. Francis v. State, 529 So. 2d 670 (Fla.1988). Following the signing of his second death warrant, the federal courts denied Francis’ petition for writ of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1986)
- Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1982)
- McCAMPBELL v. State, 421 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1982)
- Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1985)
- Wright v. Florida, 474 U.S. 1094 (U.S. 1986)
- Valle v. State, 502 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1987)
- Francis v. State, 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985)