KENNETH WAGNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Wagner appealed the revocation of his probation and resulting sentences, along with sentences from a nolo contendere plea on other charges, specifically challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the substantive judgments and sentences but reversed the trial court's imposition of costs against the indigent defendant because it violated procedural requirements for notice and hearing.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. However, the trial court erred in assessing costs against the indigent defendant without providing notice or opportunity to be heard, violating the requirements established in Jenkins v. State. All costs are therefore struck, though the trial court may reassess them after complying with proper notice and hearing procedures.
[1] A trial court errs by assessing costs against an indigent defendant without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard.
[2] Costs imposed in a written judgment that were not orally pronounced at sentencing must comply with notice and hearing requirements.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find no error in the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress. The trial court, however, did err in assessing costs against the appellant, an indigent defendant, without notice or opportunity to be heard.”
Establishes the dual holdings: suppression ruling was proper but cost assessment violated procedural requirements for indigent defendants
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWagner was serving a probation term for second degree grand theft when his probation was revoked. He also pled nolo contendere to four additional char…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Kenneth Wagner, appeals the revocation of a term of probation he was serving for second degree grand theft and the sentence imposed following that revocation. He also appeals the judgments and sentences entered after he pled nolo contendere to four other charges, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court, however, did err in assessing costs against the appellant, an indigent defendant, without notice or opportunity to be heard. We, accordingly, strike the costs but affirm the judgments and sentences in all other respects.
At sentencing on the various charges, the trial court made no oral pronouncement of its intention to assess any costs. In the written judgment on the grand theft charge, however, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay $2 pursuant to section 943.25(8), Florida Statutes (1985). Furthermore, in the written judgment for the other four charges, all of which were alleged to have occurred on July 1, 1985, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay $200 pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985), $20 pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1985), $2.50 pursuant to section 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1985), and $2 pursuant to section 943.25(8), Florida Statutes (1985). Since the trial court made no mention of costs during the sentencing bearing but later imposed them in the written judgments, the trial court failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). We, therefore, strike all costs without prejudice to the trial court’s ability to reassess the costs after complying with the requirements of Jenkins.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
DANAHY, C.J., and SCHEB and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.