STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STEVEN EDWARD OAKLEY, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a county court's dismissal of a DUI information and declaration that a statute providing a rebuttable presumption of impairment from a 0.10+ blood alcohol level is unconstitutional. The appellate court reverses, holding that the constitutional challenge was premature because it was raised pretrial rather than upon actual application at trial.
The court held that the constitutional challenge to section 316.1934 was premature because it was raised on a pretrial motion before the statute had been actually applied at trial. Constitutional issues regarding statutory presumptions are not ripe for review until the statute is actually utilized in proceedings.
[1] A constitutional challenge to a statute is not ripe for review when the statute has not yet been applied in a manner that creates a constitutional violation.
[2] A pretrial motion to dismiss an information based on the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute is premature if the statute has not yet been applied at trial.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“any ruling on the constitutionality of the subsection providing for the presumption would be premature on a motion to quash an information”
Establishes the principle that constitutional challenges to presumption statutes cannot be reviewed on pretrial motions to dismiss
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of section 316.1934(2)(…
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[*1013] PER CURIAM.
The state appeals a county court order dismissing an information against appellee and declaring section 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1985), unconstitutional. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 26.012, Florida Statutes (1985).
Appellee was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1985). He thereafter filed a motion to declare a portion of another statute, section 316.1934, invalid. He asserted that because section 316.1934(2)(c) provides that a blood alcohol level of 0.10 or more is prima facie evidence of impairment, it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof of one of the essential elements of section 316.193(l)(a) (the element of impairment) to the defendant. The county court granted the motion and dismissed the information. The court found that the state intended to offer appellee’s blood alcohol reading at trial as proof of impairment, pursuant to section 316.1934. To do so, the court held, would create an unconstitutional mandatory re-buttable presumption.
On appeal, the state contends that appel-lee prematurely raised the constitutionality of section 316.1934 in a pretrial motion, because prior to actual application of the alleged burden-shifting statute at trial, there can be no constitutional violation. We agree.
In State v. Cauley, 213 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), the state appealed an order quashing an information charging the defendants with possession of moonshine whiskey. One of the reasons relied upon by the trial court for quashing the information was that prosecution under the applicable statute, with utilization of a presumption furnished by another subsection of that statute (which subsection provided a rebuttable presumption of illegal manufacture from proof that the liquor was what is commonly known as moonshine), without allegations of time and place of manufacture, would violate the Florida Constitution. This court held that any ruling on the constitutionality of the subsection providing for the presumption would be premature on a motion to <Iuash an information,
In the present case, as in Cauley, the constitutional issue was not ripe for review.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.
REVERSE and REMAND.
HERSEY, C.J., GUNTHER, J., and RIVKIND, LEONARD A., Associate Judge, concur.
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Fla. Dep't OF Agric. & Consumer Servs. & The Fla. Comm'r of Agric. v. Mendez, 98 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…n a constitutional deprivation. See State v. Newman, 405 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla.1981) (holding that a defendant’s challenge to the statute criminalizing possession of cocaine was ripe “[o]nce defendant was charged under the statute”); State v. Oakley, 515 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (holding that a defendant’s challenge to a burden-shifting statute, contained in a pretrial motion, was not ripe “because prior to actual application of the alleged burden-shifting statute at trial, there can be no constitutional…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Merton C. Cauley and Richard Brooks, 213 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)