LARRY L. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Larry Williams challenged the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's aggravation of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) based on information about an attempted robbery during his 1971 murder conviction that was known but not used in his initial 1979 parole assessment. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of mandamus, holding that the Commission could not use previously known information to aggravate a PPRD even after it had been vacated.
The Commission may not aggravate a PPRD based on information previously known to it but not used as an aggravating factor, even when the initial PPRD has been vacated and a new interview is required. Under sections 947.16(4) and 947.173(3), F.S., a PPRD may only be modified based on new information not available at the initial interview, institutional conduct, or exceptional circumstances.
[1] A presumptive parole release date may only be changed or modified based on new information not previously available, institutional conduct, or exceptional circumstances.
[2] Information known to the Parole and Probation Commission at the time of an initial presumptive parole release date interview cannot be used as an aggravating factor in a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a PPRD may be changed or modified only on the basis of (1) new information not available at the time of the initial interview; (2) institutional conduct; or (3) exceptional circumstances”
Establishes the three exclusive statutory grounds for modifying a PPRD
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder in 1971. At his initial 1979 parole interview, the Commission had information in …
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SHIVERS, Judge.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus, in which he challenged the aggravation of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission (Commission). We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court issue the writ.
Appellant Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder in 1971 and, on November 1, 1979, was given an initial interview by the Commission in order to establish a PPRD. Although the Commission at the time had information contained in a PSI that the second-degree murder was committed during an attempted robbery, the attempted robbery was not used to aggravate appellant’s PPRD. While on parole, appellant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to two years incarceration, to run concurrently with the life term imposed for the violation of parole. A second interview was then conducted, at which the Commission aggravated appellant’s score by 24 months based on the 1985 burglary and by 136 months based on the fact that the 1971 murder was committed while attempting to rob the victim. Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission erred in aggravating his PPRD for the attempted robbery, since that information was available to the Commission at the time the initial PPRD was established.
On appeal from the denial of his petition, appellant argues that the Fourth District’s decision in Gaines v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) is directly applicable. The Commission argues, on the other hand, that appellant’s initial PPRD was vacated by his having “exit[ed] ... from the incar-cerative portion of his sentence” when he was paroled.1 (The Commission raised the same argument in Gaines, based on the petitioner’s escape in that case.) Therefore, according to the Commission, the original PPRD is void, requiring the Commission to make a de novo determination, and leaving it free to use information it had earlier chosen not to use.
We agree with appellant that the holding in Gaines is applicable here. Under sections 947.16(4) and 947.173(3), F.S., a PPRD may be changed or modified only on the basis of (1) new information not available at the time of the initial interview; (2) institutional conduct; or (3) exceptional circumstances. In Gaines, the court held that Rule 23-21.18, F.A.C. could not be given the effect of repealing or modifying the valid statutes enacted by the Legislature and, thus, held that the Commission could not aggravate the PPRD on the basis of information it previously chose not to use, since it was not new information. We do not construe Gaines as holding any portion of Rule 23-21.18 to be invalid but, on the contrary, as giving effect to both the statutes and the rule, by insuring that even when a PPRD has been vacated and a new interview is required, information previously known to the Commission may not be used as an aggravating factor. The decision in Gaines does not, as argued by the Commission, conflict with either this court’s holding in Odom v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 433 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) or in Schultz v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 432 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to issue the writ.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
THOMPSON and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Rule 23-21.18(1), F.A.C., provides as follows:
Vacation of presumptive or effective parole release date: The exiting of an inmate from the incarceration portion of his sentence, which shall include but not be limited to bond, escape, parole or MCR release, expiration of sentence, or transfer to a mental health facility, shall vacate any established presumptive parole release date. Any subsequent return to incarceration shall require an initial interview to establish a presumptive parole release date.
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Taylor v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 543 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…Fla. Parole and Probartion Comm’n, 399 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The Commission may not aggravate a PPRD on the basis of information it previously chose not to use, since it is not new information. Williams v. Fla. Parole and Probation Comm’n, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Gaines v. Fla. Parole and Probation Comm’n, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). At first blush, it appears that the Commission violated chapter 947. However, in its initial brief, the Commission argues that the significance of…
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Terry v. Fla. Prob. & Parole Comm'n, 634 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…D on the basis of information known to it but not used to aggravate the initial incarcerative term. See e.g., Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 543 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Williams v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Gaines v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla.1985).…
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Forrest Tubb v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 580 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ommission to correct Tubb’s presumptive parole release date by reducing the 120 months to 61 months. See also Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 543 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Williams v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). [*619] It should be noted that the Commission raises the argument that if this court concludes that the Commission is constrained to assess the same 61 months it had assessed in 1979, then it is possible that the computation of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Forfeiture OF ONE 1973 Mercedes 2 Door Convertible, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Tolbert v. State, 432 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Odom v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 433 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)