ROBERT P. WALLIS, PETITIONER,
v.
THE GRUMMAN CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1987-12-03
No. 70158
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
515 So. 2d 1276 Florida Supreme Court (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a product liability action brought by Wallis for injuries sustained in a Grumman aircraft crash more than twelve years after the aircraft's delivery. The Court held that the statute of repose in product liability actions applies to bar claims accruing before its legislative amendment and that a continuing duty to warn does not extend beyond the statutory repose period.


Holding

The Court held that the amendment abolishing the statute of repose does not apply retrospectively, and that Pullum applies to bar causes of action accruing between the Battilla and Pullum decisions. The Court further held that an allegation of failure to warn of a defect is clearly founded on the design and manufacture of the product, and therefore subject to the statute of repose. Since no cause of action existed at the end of the twelve-year repose period, there could be no continuing duty to warn.


Headnotes

[1] A legislative amendment abolishing a statute of repose in product liability actions does not operate retrospectively as to a cause of action that accrued before the amend…

[2] A cause of action that accrued after the decision in Battilla v. …

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The allegation of the failure of a continuing duty to warn is clearly founded on the design and manufacture of the aircraft because the duty to warn of a defect arises because of Grumman's status as a manufacturer or seller of the airplane.”

Establishes that the duty to warn is intrinsically tied to the manufacturer's status and therefore falls within the statute of repose for product liability actions.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Wallis was injured in a crash of a Grumman aircraft more than twelve years after the aircraft was delivered to its original purchaser. Wallis brought …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Justice.

GRIMES, Justice.

Pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, we review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal upon two questions certified to be of great public importance. Wallis v. Grumman Corp., 503 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Wallis was injured in the crash of a Grumman aircraft more than twelve years after delivery of that aircraft to its original purchaser. In affirming the dismissal of his product liability action, the court certified the following questions:

I. SHOULD THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT?

II. IF NOT, SHOULD THE DECISION OF PULLUM v. CINCINNATI, INC., 476 S0.2D 657 (FLA.1985), APPEAL DISMISSED, U.S. , 106 S.CT. 1626, 90 L.ED.2D 174 (1986), WHICH OVERRULED BATTILLA V. ALLIS CHALMERS MFG. CO., 392 S0.2D 874 (FLA. 1980), APPLY SO AS TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT ACCRUED AFTER THE BATTILLA DECISION BUT BEFORE THE PULLUM DECISION?

Wallis, 503 So. 2d at 365-66. We recently answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla.1987).

Wallis also argues that his allegation of breach of a duty to warn of a known defect did not give rise to a cause of action “founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property” as set forth in section 95.11(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1985). We reject this contention. The allegation of the failure of a continuing duty to warn is clearly founded on the design and manufacture of the aircraft because the duty to warn of a defect arises because of Grumman’s status as a manufacturer or seller of the airplane. Since there was no cause of action at the end of the twelve-year period, there can be no duty to warn of a defect. Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 635 F.Supp. 45 (N.D.Fla.1986); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E. 2d 207 (1981); Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 78 N.C.App. 193, 336 S.E. 2d 714 (1985), review denied, 316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E. 2d 892 (1986). Section 95.11(3)(e) applied to all theories of product liability, including the duty to warn.

Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal.

It is so ordered.

MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Felts v. State, 537 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …; Manuel v. Eig Cutlery, Inc., 515 So. 2d 980 (Fla.1987); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 518 So. 2d 900 (Fla.1987; Allen v. A.M.F., Inc., 515 So. 2d 982 (Fla.1987); Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So. 2d 667 (Fla.1987); Wallis v. The Grumman Corp., 515 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987); Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275 (Fla.1987); Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla.1987); just to cite a few of the many cases that litigated the resulting questions at all levels of the court system…
  • Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 522 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
    …n Manufacturing Corp., 506 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Desvergundt v. Koppers Company, Inc., 506 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Willer v. Pierce, 505 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Wallis v. Grumman Corp., 503 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA), approved, 515 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987); Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Manufacturing Company, 503 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA), affirmed, 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla.1987); Dominguez v. Bucyrus-Erie Company, Inc., 503 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Lane v. Koehring Company, 503 So. 2d 364 (F…
  • …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla.1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114, 106 S.Ct. 1626, 90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla.1987); Wallis v. Grumman Corp., 515 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987). HERSEY, C.J., and GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw