WILLIAM SCEARCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR USE AND BENEFIT OF RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY AND FOR USE AND BENEFIT OF FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
O.M. WILSON MOVING AND STORAGE INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION D/B/A A-1 ACE MOVING AND STORAGE CO., APPELLEE
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Scearce appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims against A-1 Ace Moving and Storage for cargo damage, arguing the company could not invoke COGSA liability limitations as a non-party to the bill of lading. The court reversed, holding that material factual questions existed regarding whether A-1 Ace was an intended third-party beneficiary entitled to COGSA protections.
The court held that because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether A-1 Ace was an intended third-party beneficiary of the COGSA provisions in the contract between Scearce and Ivory Forwarding, summary judgment was improper and the case must be remanded for trial on this factual question.
[1] The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) applies to carriers, defined as the owner or charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.
[2] COGSA does not apply to limit the liability of agents of the carrier.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It does not apply to limit the liability of agents of the carrier.”
Establishes that COGSA protections do not automatically extend to non-party agents
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Scearce shipped goods through a bill of lading contract with Ivory Forwarding, Inc., a forwarding agent/carrier. A-1 Ace Moving and Storage wa…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, A-l Ace Moving and Storage Company. The issue on appeal is whether A-l Ace was a carrier to whom the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982) (COGSA), applied to limit liability.
As defined by 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a) the “term ‘carrier’ includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.” The Act is clearly phrased to impose obligations on, and grant immunities to, the carrier. It does not apply to limit the liability of agents of the carrier. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 79 S.Ct. 766, 3 L.Ed.2d 820 (1959).
The parties to a bill of lading, however, may agree to extend the provisions of COGSA to limit the liability of third parties. In such cases the contracting parties’ intent to extend the provisions must be clearly expressed. B. Elliot (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark & Son, 704 F. 2d 1305 (4th Cir.1983); La Salle Mach. Tool, Inc. v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 611 F. 2d 56 (4th Cir.1979). Moreover, “contracts purporting to grant immunity from, or limitation of, liability must be strictly construed and limited to intended beneficiaries....” Herd, 359 U.S. at 305, 79 S.Ct. at 771.
Here, the contract of carriage was the bill of lading. The parties to the contract were the shipper, William Scearce, and the forwarding agent/carrier, Ivory Forwarding, Inc. It is undisputed that A-l Ace was not a party to the contract. Although the contract between Scearce and Ivory Forwarding incorporated COGSA and clearly expressed the time period during which the provisions of COGSA were to govern, the contract was ambiguous as to which parties were entitled to benefit from the liability-limiting provisions of COGSA. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether A-l Ace was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between Scearce and Ivory Forwarding, summary judgment should not have been granted. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985).
Reversed and remanded for consistent proceedings.
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Citator
Cited By
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Goldberg v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. & Herman T. Isis, 517 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…d to rely on the abstract. For the purpose of this action, I interpret the allegation as a claim for "intended third-party beneficiary" status. Whether a party has such status is a question of fact. See Scearce v. O.M. Wilson Moving & Storage, Inc., 516 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).…
Authorities Cited
- Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)
- Robert C. Herd & Co., Inc. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (U.S. 1959)
- LA Salle Mach. Tool, Inc. v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 611 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1979)
- B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark & SON OF Md., Inc., 704 F.2d 1305 (4th Cir. 1983)