MARK A. GEROW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that split sentences for third-degree grand theft convictions cannot exceed the five-year statutory maximum, and the trial court erred in imposing sentences that exceeded this limit.
Appellant was convicted of four counts of grand theft and sentenced to three years incarceration followed by five years probation for each count. The …
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RYDER, Judge.
Appellant was charged with eleven counts of burglary, four counts of grand theft, and two counts of petit theft. Appel lant pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and sentenced on all seventeen counts. Appellant appeals his sentences for the four grand theft convictions.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to three years’ incarceration to be followed by five years’ probation on each of his third-degree grand theft convictions. We agree.
In a split sentence, the combined number of years of incarceration and probation cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. McGraw v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.701(d)(12), committee note (1985 amendment). The maximum sentence for a third-degree grand theft felony is five years. The trial court imposed illegal sentences as to appellant’s grand theft convictions.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions and reverse and vacate his sentences on the four grand theft convictions. On remand, the trial court is to sentence appellant to three years’ incarceration to be followed by two years’ probation on each of his third-degree felony grand theft convictions.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
DANAHY, C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Randolph v. State, 626 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…e which constitutes fundamental error. See Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). A probationary split sentence cannot exceed the statutory maximum sentence. See Blizzard v. State, 600 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Gerow v. State, 516 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Thus, it was error to impose community control and probation in addition to the five-year prison term. Also, the special condition of probation that Randolph serve five years in prison was illegal. See Rosa v. State, 592 So. 2d…
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Bouie v. State, 64 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…al sentence. If the trial court wished to impose a split sentence, the combined number of years of incarceration and probation could not exceed the thirty-year statutory maximum. See Davis v. State, 35 So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Gerow v. State, 516 So. 2d 326, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for re-sentencing on count II and otherwise affirm. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED for resentenc-ing. PALMER, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.…
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Bryant v. State, 555 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. Appellant’s split sentence of four and one-half years in prison, followed by five years probation, exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, felony petit theft.* See Gerow v. State, 516 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Accordingly, we remand this case for resentenc-ing. The conviction itself, which is not contested, is affirmed. CAMPBELL, C.J., and RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur. * A felony of the third degree. § 812.014(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (…
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- McGRAW v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)