GUILLERMO SANCHEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sanchez was convicted of cocaine possession following a plea of nolo contendere while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The appellate court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court because conflicting testimony existed about whether the officer ordered the defendant to open his fist based on a hunch or whether the defendant voluntarily opened it during a pat-down, and the trial court's ruling could only be correct under one scenario.
The court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court because the denial of suppression would only be correct if the fact-finder accepted Officer Hyde's version of events (that the defendant voluntarily opened his fist during a pat-down), and the court had serious doubts that this version was accepted. The trial court must enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing which version it credited.
[1] A police officer's order to a suspect to open a closed fist, based solely on a hunch that it contains drugs, constitutes an unlawful seizure absent reasonable suspicion t…
[2] A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence may be affirmed only if the factual findings supporting the denial are supported by the record.
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Establishes the court's rationale for remanding—the suppression denial could only be correct under one factual scenario, which the trial court appears not to have credited.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Dieppa conducted a lawful investigatory stop of the defendant. During the encounter, cocaine was discovered when the defendant's closed fist w…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine upon his plea of nolo conten-dere, specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The correctness vel non of the trial court’s ruling on the motion turns on whether the defendant, having been the object of a lawful investigatory stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), was ordered by Officer Dieppa to open his closed fist, not out of any concern that the defendant was armed or posed any threat to Dieppa’s safety, but rather because of the officer’s hunch that the defendant’s fist contained cocaine; or, as the court could have found,1 the defendant voluntarily opened his fist and dropped the cocaine while his body was being patted down for weapons by Dieppa. Uniquely, the defendant’s contention is fully supported by the testimony of Officer Dieppa, a witness for the defendant at the suppression hearing, while the other, quite different scenario is fully supported by the testimony of Officer Hyde, who stated that he was three feet from the defendant and Dieppa, heard no command from Dieppa to the defendant, saw Dieppa patting down the defendant’s body (which Dieppa denied), and saw the defendant drop the cocaine from his closed fist during the pat down. _
Because the denial of suppression would be correct only if Hyde’s version were accepted by the fact-finder, see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Jamison v. State, 455 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.2d DCA 1982); Blackburn v. State, 414 So. 2d 651 (Fla.2d DCA 1982); Raleigh v. State, 404 So. 2d 1163 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); M.A.P. v. State, 403 So. 2d 1384 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); Neely v. State, 402 So. 2d 477 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), and because we have serious doubts that Hyde’s version was so accepted,2 we relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court with directions that it enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law to be filed with this court within thirty (30) days.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
. The State’s contention in the trial court and here is that the officer could have lawfully ordered the defendant to open his fist because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant and thus the search was lawful as incident thereto. The contention that there was probable cause has absolutely no factual support in the record.
. When announcing its ruling, the court mused: “And the fact that the officer told him to open up his hand and something dropped out on the ground does not in any way jeopardize this stop, nor the seizure of the evidence, nor the arrest of the defendant."
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1968)
- Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Hansel Tyrone Clarke v. State, 455 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Raleigh v. State, 404 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- M. A. P. v. State, 403 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Neely v. State, 402 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Blackburn v. State, 414 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)