DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
PHILLIP R. TROVILLO, APPELLEE
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The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services appealed a trial court order modifying child support in a URESA action, challenging the trial court's decision to direct $80 of monthly payments to the child rather than through the court clerk, the denial of a $300 monthly support increase, the denial of attorney fees, and the requirement for quarterly accounting of child support expenditures.
The court affirmed in part and reversed in part: the trial court erred in directing $80 directly to the child—the entire $200 monthly payment should go through the court clerk; the trial court properly denied the $300 increase based on evidence of Trovillo's declined financial circumstances and Mull's improved circumstances; the attorney fees issue was not properly preserved on appeal; and the quarterly accounting requirement was proper under Florida law.
[1] Child support payments ordered in a URESA action must be paid to the clerk of the court of the responding state, not directly to the child.
[2] A trial court may require the obligee to report on the disposition of child support payments as prescribed by the court.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with appellant that it was error for the trial court to order the $80.00 payments directly to the child rather than to the clerk of the court of the responding state (Florida).”
Establishes the primary error—child support must be paid through the court clerk, not directly to the child.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJudy Mull sought to increase child support from $90 to $300 per month for her minor daughter Aimee against her former husband Phillip Trovillo, who re…
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COBB, Judge.
This case arose when Judy Mull, a resident of Gainesville, Georgia, sought an increase in child - support for her minor daughter, Aimee, from $90.00 to $300.00 per month, through a URESA action filed against her former husband, Phillip Trovil-lo, who now resides in Ocala, Florida. Pursuant to Trovillo’s consent, the trial court entered an order requiring payment of $80.00 per month directly to Aimee as an allowance and $120.00 per month as child support payable through the clerk of the court. The trial court found that insufficient grounds had been alleged to justify a modification, but entered the order based on Trovillo’s consent. The trial court also required Mull to file a quarterly accounting showing expenditures made for the child, and denied her motion for attorney fees. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services appeals on behalf of Mull.
We agree with appellant that it was error for the trial court to order the $80.00 payments directly to the child rather than to the clerk of the court of the responding state (Florida). See §§ 88.211 and 88.-231(2), Fla.Stat. (1985); see also, State ex rel. Rock v. Rock, 429 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The entire $200.00 monthly payment should be made to the clerk of the court.
Appellant also challenges the trial court’s finding that there were insufficient grounds alleged to justify modification. Appellant urges that the grounds were sufficient and that, in view of the evidence adduced, the trial court should have increased the monthly support to $300.00. We find this point to be without merit in view of the evidence that Trovillo’s financial circumstances have declined, while Mull’s have improved, since their divorce in 1977.
Appellant’s argument in regard to attorney fees must fail because that issue, determined by a separate order, was not preserved by a timely appeal. Appellant’s last point challenging the propriety of the quarterly accounting ordered by the trial court must also fail in light of the provisions of section 61.13(l)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), which provide, in pertinent part, that the trial court may “require the obligee to report to the court on terms prescribed by the court regarding the disposition of the child support payments.”
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Boyt v. Romanow, 664 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ort order shall also have continuing jurisdiction to require the obligee to report to the court on terms prescribed by the court regarding the disposition of the child support payments. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Trovillo, 516 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the court held that section 61.13(l)(a) authorized the trial court to require the custodial parent to make a quarterly accounting to the court as to the expenditure of child support payments. In this case, the trial court order…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Rock, 429 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)