DAVID CABRERIZA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
David Cabreriza appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed burglary following a jury verdict. The Florida appellate court affirmed, finding no error in permitting cross-examination regarding stolen jewelry and concluding that denial of a brief attorney conference was harmless error.
The court held that both trial court rulings were proper: the cross-examination was permissible because the defendant opened the door to inquiry by falsely accusing the police of making theft accusations, and the denial of the attorney conference was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] A defendant who testifies on direct examination that police falsely accused him of possessing stolen property opens the door to cross-examination regarding the stolen nat…
[2] Evidence that property seized from a defendant was stolen in a prior burglary is admissible to rebut a false and prejudicial attack on the veracity of arresting officers…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“opened the door" to an inquiry concerning this subject by testifying on direct examination that at the time of his arrest the police "took off all my jewelry and told me that those objects [were] stolen from the victim's house."”
Establishes that defendant's own testimony provided basis for cross-examination regarding the stolen ring
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCabreriza was arrested and police seized jewelry from him, including a ring that had been stolen in a prior burglary and did not belong to him. On dir…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Opening The Door (Evidence) cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant David Cabreriza from judgments of conviction and sentences entered against him for the crimes of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed burglary of an occupied dwelling based on an adverse jury verdict. We affirm based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.
First, we see no error in the trial court’s ruling below which permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant as a witness as to the stolen nature of a ring seized from him by the police at the time of his arrest. The defendant, we think, “opened the door” to an inquiry concerning this subject by testifying on direct examination that at the time of his arrest the police “took off all my jewelry and told me that those objects [were] stolen from the victim’s house.” (emphasis added).
The import of this testimony was that the police had falsely accused the defendant of having stolen jewelry in his possession — an accusation which the state denied having been made. In fact, as was established on cross-examination, the police seized jewelry from the defendant, including a ring which did not, in fact, belong to him, but had been stolen in a prior burglary. We think this evidence was properly admitted below to rebut the false and highly prejudicial attack on the veracity of the arresting officers made by the defendant on direct examination. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
Second, we think the error in denying the defendant an opportunity to confer with his counsel during a five-minute court recess while the defendant was on the witness stand testifying at trial was a harmless error. This is so because it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that this error could not possibly have affected the verdict. The sole purpose of the conference was to discuss the state’s impending cross-examination concerning the above-stated ring — and it is plain that this conference could not have prevented the facts from being established as they were on cross-examination.
Moreover, the fact that the defendant was never criminally charged with reference to the above ring could have been brought out, but was not, on redirect examination without a prior conference between the defendant and his counsel. Given this showing and the otherwise sufficient evidence to sustain this conviction, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no possibility that the verdict would have been different if the conference had been allowed. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 507 So. 2d 1074 (Fla.1987).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Leerdam v. State, 891 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…re subject to harmless error analysis, wherein the State is afforded the opportunity to prove that the constitutional deprivation did not contribute to the verdict. See id.; Thompson, 507 So. 2d at 1075; Bova, 410 So. 2d at 1345; Cabreriza v. State, 517 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In Amos, our supreme court did not cite any federal authority in its discussion of the constitutional • right to counsel, even though the dissent argued that the denial of access to counsel during the one-hour recess was not…
Authorities Cited
- Thompson v. State, 507 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1987)
- Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)