MID-FLORIDA MINING COMPANY AND CLAIMS CENTER, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROBERT GIBSON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the deputy commissioner's order modifying a prior order but reversed the finding that the claimant was temporarily and totally disabled from January 1, 1986 through the hearing date. The court held that the claimant's testimony alone, without supporting medical evidence, was insufficient to establish a change in disability status, and limited benefits to the specific periods covered by disability slips.
The court held that a claimant's own testimony regarding increased pain and inability to work, without supporting medical testimony, is insufficient to establish a change in condition or disability status. The court limited the award of benefits to only those specific periods covered by the three disability slips and held that the claimant was not entitled to be excused from a work search during the periods between those slips.
[1] A claimant's own testimony regarding increased pain and inability to work, without supporting medical evidence, is insufficient to establish a change in condition.
[2] Benefits for temporary total disability are limited to periods specifically documented by medical advisories indicating such disability.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A claimant's own testimony as to increased pain and inability to work, absent supporting medical testimony, is insufficient to establish a change in condition.”
Establishes the legal standard that medical corroboration is required to support disability claims based on subjective complaints.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe claimant suffered a work injury and was treated by a physician who, on December 12, 1985, found the claimant had a normal left knee examination, w…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Work Search Requirement cases and more on FLexlaw
WIGGINTON, Judge.
The employer/carrier appeal the deputy commissioner’s order modifying an earlier order and finding claimant to be temporarily and totally disabled from January 1, 1986, and continuing through the date of the hearing with the exception of a period of time in March during which claimant attempted employment. Although we affirm the order modifying the prior order of June 18, 1985, we must reverse the deputy’s finding that claimant’s period of temporary total disability began on January 1,1986, and continued through the date of the hearing. A claimant’s own testimony as to increased pain and inability to work, absent supporting medical testimony, is insufficient to establish a change in condition. East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevens, 437 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
In the instant case, apart from his testimony as to pain and his inability to work, there is absolutely no evidence as to claimant’s disability status between December 12, 1985 — the date his treating physician diagnosed a normal left knee examination and opined that claimant was at maximum medical improvement with no impairment or residuals and without work restriction — and June 6, 1986, the date on which claimant was next examined.
We also limit the award of benefits to those periods of time specifically set forth on the three disability slips appearing in the record advising claimant that he was temporarily and totally disabled. Those periods of time were from June 9, 1986, through July 2, 1986; October 27, 1986, through November 24, 1986; and November 24, 1986, through December 8, 1986. Thus, since claimant was specifically advised that there were parameters to his temporary total disability, he should have known that he was released for work in between those times. Thus, we hold that claimant was not entitled to be excused from a work search, in contrast to the claimants in Daytona Linen Service v. Davis, 454 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Fulmer-Orlando v. Taylor, 419 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Nickolls v. Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt., 606 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ht about as a result of an industrial accident has been the subject of many decisions. For example, a claimant’s bare subjective complaints of pain do not excuse the worker from the duty of conducting a work search. Mid-Florida Mining Co. v. Gibson, 517 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). It is moreover the general rule that a job search may be excused only if medical evidence is presented showing claimant’s inability to work. See Philpot v. City of Miami, 541 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Nevertheless, the wor…
Authorities Cited
- Fulmer-Orlando v. Taylor, 419 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Daytona Linen Serv. & Mission Ins. Co. v. Cora M. Davis, 454 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- E. Manor Med. Care Ctr. & Ranger Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 437 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)