JAKE GALLOWAY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Jake Galloway was convicted of assault with intent to commit manslaughter after being indicted for assault with intent to commit murder. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial because the trial court's jury instruction improperly required the jury to be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant lacked homicidal intent before convicting him of the lesser offense, rather than allowing a reasonable doubt standard.
The trial court erred in giving a charge that required the jury to be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant had no intent to take the life of the person assaulted. The correct rule is that a reasonable doubt in the jury's minds as to any element of the higher degree of offense calls for a verdict of the lower degree, where no reasonable doubt exists regarding every element of the lower offense.
“The prime vice in the charge is that it requires that the jury be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant had no intent to take the life of the person assaulted before they would be justified in finding him guilty of the lower rather than of the higher degree of crime.”
Identifies the fundamental error in the trial court's instruction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJake Galloway was indicted for assault with intent to commit murder. At trial, he was convicted of the lesser offense of assault with intent to commit…
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Cockrell, J.
— Jake Galloway was indicted for assault with intent to commit murder and convicted of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter. We deem it necessary to notice but two assignments of error: the refusal to give the fourth instruction requested by the defendant, and the giving of the charge substituted therefor by the court. The charge given reads: “The defendant’s attorneys have submitted a charge upon aggravated assault, which I have refused to give as asked, but I give you as the law of this case — that if you believe from the evidence that the defendant assaulted the said Luther Russ with a deadly weapon, not having a premeditated design to effect the death of the person assaulted, you may find the defendant guilty of an aggravated assault. But, before you would be justified in reducing the crime to an aggravated assault, you should be satisfied from the evidence that the assault was made without any homicidal intent.” The prime vice in the charge is that it requires that the jury be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant had no intent to take the life of the person assaulted before they would be justified in finding him guilty of the lower rather than of the higher degree of crime. The true rule is that a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the existence of any element of the higher degree or offense calls for a verdict of the lower degree, where there exists no reasonable doubt of the existence of every element necessary to constitute the latter offense. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the degree of the crime, as well as the other fact of the crime itself, in order to obtain a verdict for that degree, and the accused is not put to the necessity of “satisfying” the jury that the lower degree only has been committed. 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (Snd ed.) 171; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (Snd ed.) 95S, and cases cited. See, also, Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166, 12 South. Rep. 453, and Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156, 20 South. Rep. 235. The charge requested recognized this distinction and, except for the omission, probably a clerical misprision of the word “find” in the last sentence after the word “but” in the second clause, might properly have been given if the defendant so desired.
For the error in giving the foregoing charge the judgment will be reversed and a new trial granted.
Hocker, Shackleford and Carter, JJ., concur. Taylor, C. J., absent on account of sickness.
Whitfield, J., disqualified, took no part in the consideration of this case.
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Citator
Cited By
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Pensacola Elec. Co. v. Bissett, 59 Fla. 360 (Fla. 1910)…rdsj “satisfy” and “satisfaction,” when used in charges and instructions, this court has rather clearly defined its position. See Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166, 12 South. Rep. 453; Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156, 20 South. Rep. 235; Galloway v. State, 47 Fla. 32, 36 South. Rep. 168, all cited-' to us by the plaintiff in error, as is also the cases of Torrey v. Burney, 113 Ala. 496, 21 South. Rep. 348, and Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. Rep. 627, all of which we have examined, as well as the authoritie…
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Smith v. State, 147 Fla. 191 (Fla. 1941)…he first degree and the person charged as principal in the second degree may be tried and [*197] convicted even if the principal in the first degree has been acquitted of the charge. See Croft v. State, 117 Fla. 832, 158 Sou. 454; Galloway v. State, 47 Fla. 32, 36 Sou. 168; Henry v. State, 81 Fla. 763, 89 Sou. 136; McCall v. State, 120 Fla. 707, 163 Sou. 38; Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 Sou. 851. This charge was prejudicial to the defendants and constituted reversible error. The judgment should be re…
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Burnard Whitten v. State, 86 Fla. 111 (Fla. 1923)…ession fall, either by questions or otherwise, that is capable of being interpreted by the jury as an index of what he thinks of the prisoner, his. counsel or his case. ’ ’ See also Lane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 South. Rep. 896; Galloway v. State, 47 Fla. 32, 36 South. Rep. 168; Disney v. State, 72 Fla. 492, 73 South. Rep. 598. This admonition will be lightly heeded by trial judges’ if appellate-courts condone such expressions. Some of the errors that I refer to as of lesser weight are only so by compa…
Authorities Cited
- Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156 (Fla. 1896)
- Pompey Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166 (Fla. 1893)