DONNA HARRIS GRIFFIN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court enforced its mandate requiring a proper resentencing hearing after determining that a departure sentence was grounded on both permissible and impermissible reasons. The trial court had violated due process by issuing a chambers order confirming the sentence without holding a full resentencing proceeding with the defendant's presence.
A full resentencing proceeding with the defendant and attorney present is constitutionally required. The pronouncement of sentence is a critical stage of criminal proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach, and a defendant must have the opportunity to present evidence relevant to sentencing.
[1] A departure sentence grounded on both permissible and impermissible reasons must be reversed and the defendant resentenced unless the state can show beyond a reasonable d…
[2] A resentencing proceeding requires a full sentencing hearing, including the presence of the defendant and their attorney.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we answered the certified question, holding that a departure sentence grounded on both permissible and impermissible reasons must be reversed and the defendant resentenced unless the state is able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of the impermissible reason(s) would not have affected the departure sentence”
Establishes the core holding from the prior Supreme Court decision regarding mixed-reason departure sentences
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGriffin's departure sentence was based on both valid and invalid reasons. On remand from the Supreme Court's earlier decision, the trial court issued …
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PER CURIAM.
In this cause this Court did review Griffin v. State, 470 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), in which the District Court certified a question of great public importance. In our opinion dated December 5, 1985, Griffin v. State, 479 So. 2d 739 (Fla.1985), we answered the certified question, holding that a departure sentence grounded on both permissible and impermissible reasons must be reversed and the defendant resen-tenced unless the state is able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of the impermissible reason(s) would not have affected the departure sentence. Accordingly, we quashed the district court’s decision with directions that the district court remand to the trial court for resentencing.
On remand, it appears that the trial court merely issued in chambers an order confirming that the departure sentence would have been imposed upon the Petitioner based solely on the valid written reasons. The trial judge did not interpret this Court's opinion as requiring a resentencing hearing and, therefore, a hearing was not held and neither Petitioner nor Petitioner’s counsel was present or otherwise allowed to be heard.
This Court specifically directed a resentencing in this cause rather than directing the trial court to merely affirm that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the impermissible reasons. By resentencing we mean a full sentencing proceeding which necessarily includes the presence of the defendant and his or her attorney. The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or, as here, the sentence is the result of an order directing the trial court to resentence the defendant. See State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1983). The presence of the defendant is as necessary at resentencing as it was at the time of the original sentence so that the defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence if warranted unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Pursuant to the power of this Court to enforce its mandate, the trial court’s order, dated February 12, 1986, is hereby vacated and the trial judge is directed to hold a resentencing proceeding consistent with this order. It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (25 total)
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Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 2014)…rings as well. See Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160 (finding that defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure and thus extending the right to be present to the hearing where the sentence will be reconsidered); Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) (finding presence of defendant necessary at resentencing so that defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence, if warranted); State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983) (finding defendant entitled to…
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State v. Ransom Louis Collins, 985 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2008)…ue is whether granting the State a second opportunity to demonstrate that Collins meets the criteria for habitualization violates due process. We hold that it does not. Certainly, due process principles apply to a resentencing. See Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) (“The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or, as here, the senten…
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Mullins v. State, 997 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…fendant will receive a new sentencing hearing if the resentencing involves additional consideration or sentencing discretion, not if the act to be done is ministerial in nature, such as striking an improper portion of the sentence. Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1987); McGough v. State, 876 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Although striking the violent career criminal designation is a ministerial act, here the entire fifteen year sentence must be vacated, and Mullins must be resentenced with an entire ne…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1983)
- Griffin v. State, 470 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Griffin v. State, 479 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1985)