FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT AUTO LEASE, INC. AND LINDA SINGERMAN, APPELLEES
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First State Insurance Company appealed a summary judgment finding that it provided excess insurance coverage to General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc. The court affirmed, holding that the insurance policy's ambiguous excess coverage provisions could be clarified through parol evidence showing the parties' intent, and that attorney's fees were properly awarded under Florida statute.
The court affirmed that the ambiguous excess coverage provisions were properly interpreted through parol evidence to establish the coverage the parties intended, and that attorney's fees with a multiplier factor were properly awarded even though the insured hired counsel on a partial contingency fee contract basis.
[1] A court-awarded attorney's fee may exceed the percentage of recovery specified in a contingency fee agreement when the agreement allows for the higher of the percentage o…
[2] A contingency fee agreement may provide for attorney's compensation to be the greater of a specified percentage of recovery or an amount awarded by the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the excess coverage provisions were less than a model of clarity, did not clearly state that coverage was only excess over $1,100,000, and made it extremely unclear as to what the excess coverage was”
Establishes that the policy language was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant parol evidence interpretation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFirst State issued an excess insurance policy to General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc. The policy contained ambiguous provisions regarding the amou…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the excess insurance carrier, First State Insurance Company [First State] from a final summary judgment determining that First State provided insurance coverage to its insured, General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc. We affirm based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.
First, we conclude that the subject insurance policy was ambiguous as to the amount of the excess insurance coverage, and that the parol evidence introduced below established that the parties intended to provide the coverage which the trial court ordered. We will not burden this opinion with a detailed analysis of why this is so, but suffice it to say that the excess coverage provisions were less than a model of clarity, did not clearly state that coverage was only excess over $1,100,000, and made it extremely unclear as to what the excess coverage was. Accordingly, the trial court properly took parol testimony from the insurance company’s own representative as to the intent of the parties regarding the ambiguous excess coverage provision. This testimony clearly establishes that the parties intended the excess coverage ordered by the trial court in the final judgment. This being so, the final judgment must be affirmed on the coverage issue. See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Florida Testing & Eng’g Co., 511 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Drisdom v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Landis v. Mears, 329 So. 2d 323, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
Second, we further conclude that the attorney’s fee order entered in favor of the insured, see § 627.428, Fla.Stat.(1985), must also be affirmed as it is supported by substantial competent evidence below. We specifically reject the appellant’s argument that no multiplier factor is proper under the lodestar method of assessing attorney’s fees established by Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), where, as here, the client insured hires an attorney on a partial contingency fee contract basis. Such a partial contingency contract might very well affect the size of the multiplier factor, but not the entitlement to such a factor. Here no challenge is made to the size of the multiplier factor employed in this case, only to the entitlement to same. We, accordingly, find no error in the entry of the attorney’s fee order in this case. See Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); cf. Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1987); Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass’n v. Saylor, 495 So. 2d 782, 784-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass’n v. Hanauer, 494 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
Affirmed.
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Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1990)…KOGAN, Justice. We have for review Head v. Lane, 541 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), based on express and direct conflict with First State Insurance Co. v. General Electric Credit, Auto Lease, Inc., 518 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. This case asks us to decide whether a trial court should apply the “lodestar” formula, see Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), to enhance c…
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SUN Bank OF Ocala v. Jacques Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1990)…Sun Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 553 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), wherein the district court relied on Head v. Lane, 541 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and certified conflict with First State Insurance Co. v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 518 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the result reached in Sun Bank. This case involves the general question of whether attorneys who enter into partial contingent-fee agreements may have the court ass…
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Land O'Sun Realty Ltd. v. Rewjb GAS Invs., 685 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…, Inc. v. Equiventure Fla., 567 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), review denied, 577 So. 2d 1325 (Fla.1991); Tropicana Club, Inc. v. James H. Topping, Inc., 502 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); First State Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 518 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Royal Continental Hotels, Inc. v. Broward Vending, Inc., 404 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The evidence on that issue was completely contradictory. Apart from their principal’s testimony that paragraph 3 was simply redundant, b…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Landis v. Mears, 329 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Rosetta Drisdom v. Guar. Tr. Life Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Auvel Saylor and Margaret Saylor, 495 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hanauer, 494 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Mut. Fire v. Fla. Testing & Eng'g Co., 511 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)