KEVIN CHARLES GILLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kevin Gillis was convicted of third-degree felony murder based on a homicide occurring during a marijuana transaction. The appellate court reversed the conviction because the trial court improperly admitted a codefendant's post-arrest police statement as substantive evidence, which violated the rule against using inconsistent prior statements by witnesses who testify at trial.
The court held that such statements cannot be admitted as substantive evidence. Under the rule established in Delgado-Santos v. State and codified in the Florida Evidence Code section 90.804(2)(c), a codefendant's inconsistent post-arrest statement is generally inadmissible. The exception applies only when the statement was given under oath in a formal proceeding subject to perjury penalties, but police custodial interrogation does not constitute a formal proceeding.
[1] A codefendant's statement made during a post-arrest custodial interrogation, which is inconsistent with their trial testimony, cannot be admitted as substantive evidence…
[2] A statement made by a witness during a police custodial interrogation is not considered to have been made under oath in a formal proceeding subject to the penalty of perj…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule is generally that a statement made by a codefendant during police custodial interrogation, inconsistent with his testimony at trial, cannot be introduced as substantive evidence at a trial of the defendant.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that governs admissibility of codefendant statements in criminal trials
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKirkland, a codefendant, was called as a state witness and testified consistently with defendant Gillis's trial testimony. The prosecutor then introdu…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Two arguments are advanced by the defendant as grounds for granting him a new trial on a conviction for third-degree felony murder: (1) the trial court erred in admitting as substantive evidence a statement of a codefendant, which had been obtained by the police in a post-arrest custodial interrogation, inconsistent with the codefendant’s trial testimony; and (2) the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of sale or delivery of marijuana, the offense alleged in the information as the felony underlying the charge of third-degree felony murder. Kirkland, a codefendant called as a state witness, gave testimony at trial which was consistent with the defendant’s trial testimony. The prosecutor then questioned Kirkland regarding inconsistent statements made in a post-arrest interrogation which implicated the defendant. Kirkland admitted giving the statements to the police but claimed that the statements were untrue. Over the defendant’s objection, the statements made in the post-arrest interrogation were admitted as substantive evidence.
We agree with the defendant that our opinion in Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1986), is controlling, and we reverse. The rule is generally that a statement made by a codefendant during police custodial interrogation, inconsistent with his testimony at trial, cannot be introduced as substantive evidence at a trial of the defendant. The basic rule is codified in the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985).
The exception to the general rule is that a statement of a codefendant given pretrial, which is inconsistent with his trial testimony, may be admitted as substantive evidence where the statement was given under oath in a formal proceeding, subject to the penalty of perjury. § 90.801(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). A police questioning, however, is not a formal proceeding. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1986).
Kirkland’s post-arrest statement was crucial in that it established that the homicide occurred during a marijuana transaction which transaction was the sole underpinning of the third-degree felony murder charge.
It is unnecessary to examine the second issue, but since the case must be retried on the first issue, we caution that the jury should be fully instructed on the elements of the underlying felony, as charged.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Godfrey ERA v. State, 590 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…e against Era. “The rule is generally that a statement made by a codefendant during police custodial interrogation, inconsistent with his testimony at trial, cannot be introduced as substantive evidence at a trial of the defendant.” Gillis v. State, 518 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). However, that error was harmless in light of Era’s own confession to police.1 See Dobson v. State, 542 So. 2d 1047, 1048-1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (although admission of codefendant’s confession was error, error was harmless,…
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Valenci Williams v. State, 593 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…nd Era were admissible against both defendants. [*1190] The general rule is that a custodial statement made by a codefendant, inconsistent with his testimony at trial, cannot be used as substantive evidence in the defendant’s trial. Gillis v. State, 518 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The court’s ruling that Era’s custodial statement was admissible against Williams was particularly egregious in this case because the introduction of the nontestifying codefendant’s statement violated Williams’s right of con…
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Coloma v. State, 600 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…the wounds as being caused by different instruments. The State concedes, correctly, that the victim’s prior statement, which was inconsistent with her in-court testimony, should not have been admitted as substantive evidence. See Gillis v. State, 518 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Nevertheless, it contends, the out-of-court statement was mostly cumulative to evidence already clearly established in the record and was therefore nonprejudicial, citing State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306 (Fla.1990). The State also…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986)
- Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)