DONALD HUGHES, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, BROWARD COUNTY, ALMA WOODS, FRANK MCCASKILL, DOROTHY MCCLOVER AND ALFREDA JOHNSON, APPELLEES
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Motorcyclist Donald Hughes sued the City of Fort Lauderdale and Broward County for injuries from a collision caused by foliage obscuring a stop sign. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, but the appellate court affirmed as to the City and reversed as to the County, finding that maintenance of traffic control devices is an operational-level duty covered by sovereign immunity only at the planning level.
The City properly contracted away its maintenance obligations to the County, so summary judgment for the City is affirmed. The County cannot use administrative manual language classifying the obligation as merely advisory to shield itself from liability; maintenance is an operational-level duty, and whether the County breached its duty by failing to trim foliage is a factual question precluding summary judgment.
[1] A municipality may contract with a county to transfer the duty of maintaining traffic control devices, including stop signs.
[2] The duty to prevent foliage from obscuring the face of a traffic control sign constitutes an operational level function, not a planning level function.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We do not agree that the County's duty vis-a-vis the stop sign and the motoring public may be absolutely controlled by a manual or regulation adopted by an administrative agency.”
Establishes that administrative manuals cannot unilaterally determine the legal scope of governmental duty
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonald Hughes was injured in a motorcycle-automobile collision at an intersection where foliage obscured a stop sign. The City of Fort Lauderdale had …
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HERSEY, Chief Judge.
Donald Hughes brought an action against several defendants, including the City of Fort Lauderdale and Broward County, for injuries sustained in a collision between his motorcycle and an automobile. He alleged that the accident occurred because foliage obscured a stop sign at the intersection where the accident took place. The trial court entered summary final judgment for both the City and the County and Hughes appeals. The remaining defendants are not involved in this appeal.
The City defends by relying on a contract entered into in 1976 which transferred the duty of “repair and maintenance” of the stop sign in question, and others, to the County.
The County’s defense is that “maintenance” does not include clearing foliage from the right-of-way. Alternatively, the County points out that its duties with reference to stop signs are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways published by the State Department of Transportation. The manual specifies only that material such as shrubbery should not be permitted to obscure the face of any traffic control sign. The manual also defines “should” as relating to recommended but not mandatory procedures — an advisory condition which places it at the planning level rather than the operational level. Thus, says the County, sovereign immunity shields it from damage claims based upon negligence.
We affirm the summary final judgment entered in favor of the City of Ft. Lauderdale. We agree that the City could and did contract with the County to maintain the traffic control device involved here. As between the City and the County, any duty to prevent the face of the stop sign from being obscured by foliage or other material was effectively transferred by contract to the County.
We do not agree that the County’s duty vis-a-vis the stop sign and the motoring public may be absolutely controlled by a manual or regulation adopted by an administrative agency. Thus, we do not subscribe to the County’s argument that the obligation to prevent material from obscuring the face of the stop sign was merely advisory and therefore a planning level function simply because the manual says so. This is particularly true where the settled law of Florida is to the contrary. Maintenance is an operational, not a planning level function. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979); Department of Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.1982). See also Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners v. Salas, 511 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1987).
Whether Broward County breached its duty of care by failing to trim foliage which obscured the traffic control device is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes a summary final judgment. As to the County, we reverse the summary final judgment and remand for further proceedings. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
DOWNEY, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
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Piedra v. City OF N. BAY Vill., 193 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…ning the bulb-out areas. See Commercial Carder, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979); Dep’t. Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.1982). See also Palm Beach County Bd. of Cty. Commr’s v. Salas, 511 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1987); Hughes v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). To be sure, [Sovereign immunity does not bar an action against a governmental entity for rendering an intersection dangerous by reason of obstructions to visibility if the danger is hidden or presents a trap and the governm…
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Capo v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 642 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…he basis of a suit against a governmental entity.” Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1078. Because the duty to properly maintain roads arises at the operational level of government, sovereign immunity does not apply. See id.; Hughes v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“Maintenance is an operational, not a planning level function.”). In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the DOT negligently maintained the exit ramp by allowing foliage to grow so that it hindered…
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Simmonds-Hewett v. Keaton, 626 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…hield itself from liability simply by refraining from inspections or maintenance of improvements. Neither would adopting a policy of non-inspection convert a maintenance function into a planning level activity. Cf. Hughes v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Armas v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Neither rationale is consistent with the guidelines of Trianon and each would require a modification of the Trianon approach to sovereign immunity, reiterated…
Authorities Cited
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)
- Dep't OF Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982)
- Palm Beach Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Salas, 511 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1987)