ORLANDO DIAZ, PETITIONER,
v.
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP., RESPONDENT
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The court approved the lower court's decision based on prior rulings in related cases.
The case involved certified questions regarding the retrospective application of a legislative amendment to a statute of repose in product liability a…
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OVERTON, Justice.
We accepted jurisdiction in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz, 507 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer the following three certified questions of great public importance:
I.Should the legislative amendment of Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accured before the effective date of the amendment?
II.If not, should the decision of Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla.1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114, 106 S.Ct. 1626, 90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), which overruled Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.1980), apply so as to bar a cause of action that accrued after the Battilla decision but before the Pullum decision?
III.In the event that the court construes the legislative amendment abolishing the statute of repose in product liability cases to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment, or in the event that the court decides that Pullum does not bar a cause of action, as here, that accrued after the Battilla decision, does Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) permit a court to relieve a party from a final judgment grounded on Pullum?
507 So. 2d at 1199. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. Since we accepted jurisdiction, we answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufac turing Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla.1987). Our answers to the first two certified questions make it unnecessary to answer the third.
We approve the decision below on the authority of Melendez.
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, C.J., and EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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State v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…more, a judgment having “prospective application” within the meaning of this Rule, even though the judgment does have continuing res judicata effect. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz, 507 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), approved on other grounds, 519 So. 2d 610 (Fla.1988). We need not now decide whether the same analysis will ordinarily apply to defendants against whom final judgment has been entered. See generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2863, at 204-11 (1973) and case…
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Pozo v. Prada, 563 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…2d 117 (Fla.1985). See State ex rel. Metropolitan Dade County v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (on rehearing); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz, 507 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), approved on other grounds, 519 So. 2d 610 (Fla.1988). See generally DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1984).…
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Decamp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (M.D. Fla. 2021)…198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (noting that, for purposes of Rule 1.540(b)(5), “a judgment dismissing a plaintiff’s action for damages is not deemed to have prospective application merely because the plaintiff continues to be bound by it”), approved, 519 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1988). Thus, State Farm reasons, because Rule 1.540(b)(5) could not be used to set aside the dismissal order, the state court’s order setting aside the dismissal and entering judgment in favor of the Decamps was legally void. (Id…
Authorities Cited
- Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985)
- Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1987)
- Dante A. Battilla and Gail A. Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. & Travelers Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980)
- Humphrey v. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assn., 475 U.S. 1114 (U.S. 1986)
- Rhode Island v. Manocchio, 475 U.S. 1114 (U.S. 1986)
- Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz, 507 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)