RAUL WAGNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A trial court has no authority to impose a felony sentence in absentia.
[1] A trial court has no authority to impose a felony sentence in the defendant's absence.
[2] A defendant's presence is essential at the imposition of a felony sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted of cocaine trafficking and sentenced in absentia after absconding during trial. He later filed a motion to vacate the sent…
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STONE, Judge.
The defendant absconded during trial where he was charged with trafficking in cocaine. He was convicted of the charges and sentenced, in absentia, to 30 years in prison. After his apprehension, he filed a motion to vacate the sentence which was denied.
The state contends that public policy and a reasonable reading of rule 3.180, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, support a conclusion that a defendant who voluntarily absents himself from the sentencing waives his right to be present. The state argues that defendants should be sentenced while the evidence is fresh in the mind of the judge, and that a fugitive should not be allowed to thumb his nose at the court. However, the state cites no authority in support of sentencing in absen-tia.
Rule 3.180(a)(9) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(a) presence of defendant. In all prosecutions for crime the defendant shall be present: (9) At the pronouncement of judgment and the imposition of sentence.
Our courts have consistently required defendant’s presence at resentencings, recognizing that sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1983); Thacker v. State, 185 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). See also Keller v. State, 432 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
Rule 3.180(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the completion of a trial and rendering of a verdict where the defendant has absconded during a trial. However, that rule clearly stops short of authorizing sentencing to proceed in the defendant’s absence. Recently, in Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), it was held that the defendant’s presence is essential at the imposition of a felony sentence. We concur. A trial court has no authority to impose sentence for a felony in absentia. The motion to vacate sentence should have been granted.
Therefore, the order is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
HERSEY, C.J., and DELL, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1992)…McDonald, justice. We review Capuzzo v. State, 578 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), which is in direct and express conflict with Wagner v. State, 519 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), and Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), approved on other grounds, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988).1 The issue is whether persons convicted of crimes can be sentenced without being present when they, with actual kn…
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Gelsey v. State, 565 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…t be imposed in the absence of the defendant, Rule 3.180(b) is specific as to a defendant who absences himself without leave of the court. Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1987), approved, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988); Wagner v. State, 519 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Meek v. State, 487 So. 2d 1058 (Fla.1986). The record supports the trial judge’s finding that Gelsey was voluntarily absent from closing arguments and jury instructions, since he was absent without leave of the court. He was pr…
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Capuzzo v. State, 578 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…er voluntarily absenting himself from the sentencing hearing. Capuzzo points out that both the Second and the Fourth Districts have held that a defendant’s presence at the sentencing hearing is fundamental and cannot be waived under Wagner v. State, 519 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), and Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), approved on other grounds, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988). We do not agree with our sister courts in Wagner or Quarterman. Our opinion in Roseman v. State, 497 So. 2d 986 (…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1983)
- Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Thacker v. State, 185 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Keller v. State, 432 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)