MARIANNA TEMPLE, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
JOHN TEMPLE, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's equitable distribution of marital assets and lump sum alimony award, but reversed and remanded for the award of attorney's fees and costs to the wife, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the parties' lengthy separation when allocating stock acquired post-separation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the equitable distribution and lump sum alimony determinations, considering the lengthy separation period as justification for unequal treatment of post-separation acquired stock. However, the trial court erred in failing to award attorney's fees and costs to the wife where the husband's assets and earnings substantially exceeded hers.
[1] A trial court may consider a lengthy period of separation between spouses as a factor justifying disparate treatment in the equitable distribution of marital assets.
[2] The time of acquisition of an asset following a separation is a factor that a trial court may reasonably consider in determining equitable distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As a rule, marital property should be distributed equally.”
Establishes the general principle governing marital asset distribution in Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties separated at least four years before the husband filed for dissolution of marriage. The husband, president of a large corporation, acquire…
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STONE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The wife contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining the distribution of the marital assets and the award of lump sum alimony, and in failing to award attorney’s fees and costs. The husband cross appeals as to the amount of lump sum alimony awarded, and as to the selection of the date the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed as the time for determining the marital assets.
The parties were separated for at least four years prior to the filing of the petition for dissolution. The husband is the president of a large corporation. The wife has a master’s degree and has passed the C.P.A. exam. After the couple’s separation, but before filing for divorce, the husband acquired a substantial amount of company stock by participating in a corporate buyout, primarily using borrowed funds as well as sums earned after the separation. Although this stock was acquired prior to filing, it was not evenly divided in the equitable distribution allocation. The wife, who received only 20,000 shares out of over 100,000, contends this was error. See Berger v. Berger, 464 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
The evidence as to value was conflicting. The wife contends that she received only 20% of their total assets, while the husband argues that she received over 40%, after considering taxes and liabilities. In addition to the company stock, which was valued between $600,000.00 and $1,000,000.00, the wife received various marital assets valued at over $350,000.00, and $660,000.00 in lump sum alimony. Nevertheless, it is clear that the husband received substantially more than the wife as a result of the unequal distribution of the stock acquired during the separation. As a rule, marital property should be distributed equally. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1986); Grimmett v. Grimmett, 425 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). However, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider factors such as a lengthy period of separation as justification for disparate treatment. Here, the stock would not have been a marital asset had either party filed for dissolution within a year or two of their separation. The time of the acquisition following separation is a factor that the trial court may reasonably take into consideration.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering these facts in arriving at the amount and form of equitable distribution. See Canakaris v. Canakaris; Geisinger v. Geisinger, 436 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Casto v. Casto, 458 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1987); Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1985); Sloman v. Sloman, 418 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Green v. Green, 442 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
The trial court did err in failing to award attorney’s fees and costs to the wife where the husband’s assets and earnings were substantially greater than hers. Cf. Novak v. Novak, 429 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 438 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1983); Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Sloman v. Sloman. In all other respects, we find no abuse of discretion.
The final judgment is therefore affirmed, except that we reverse and remand for the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the wife.
GLICKSTEIN, J., and BLOOM, PHILIP, Associate Judge, concur.
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Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…increases in value attributable to marital labor, funds, inflation, and market conditions will all apply.”) 6. The value of profit sharing plan funds acquired during the separation, and passive growth derived from such funds. See Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The scant documentary evidence in the record shows that the profit sharing plan had a value of about $292,000.00 at the conclusion of the fiscal year closest to the date Mrs. Moon filed her petition. Unfortunately, the final ju…
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Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…assets, noting that “a degree of inequity has resulted that cannot be perceived as lying within the trial court's discretion,” even though in Bridges the wife’s income generating ability was only about half that of the husband. In Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), this court reaffirmed Woodard, stating, “As a rule, marital property should be distributed equally.” Then in Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), in an en banc decision this court unanimously adopted the position…1 / 2
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Elliott Ross v. Bandi, 566 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…. 2d 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Accordingly, we affirm point I on appeal. On the other hand, we find merit in appellant’s argument that the trial court erred when it determined appellant’s corporate stock to be marital property. In Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), appeal after remand, 539 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the parties were separated at least four years prior to filing the petition for dissolution. Appellee husband acquired 100,000 shares of stock by using borrowed funds as w…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987)
- Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985)
- Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Guest v. Anderson, 425 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Albert J.W. Novak v. Novak, 429 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Bette Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Berger v. Berger, 464 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Casto v. Casto, 458 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)