ANTINOGENES RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found in his vehicle during a search by a Florida Highway Patrol officer. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant validly consented to the search of his trunk where cocaine was discovered.
The trial court's finding of valid consent was supported by sufficient evidence. The state met its burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant's consent by a preponderance of the evidence, and there was no antecedent police misconduct that would have presumptively tainted the subsequent consent.
[1] A traffic stop for speeding is a lawful basis for a law enforcement officer to initiate an investigation.
[2] A defendant's nervousness during a lawful traffic stop does not, by itself, establish police misconduct that taints subsequent consent to search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The state's burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant's consent by a preponderance of the evidence was clearly met. There was no antecedent police misconduct which would have presumptively tainted the subsequent consent.”
Establishes the legal standard for valid consent and the state's evidentiary burden
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped defendant's automobile for speeding (67 mph in a 55 mph zone) on Interstate 10. After the stop, the officer n…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant validly consented to the Florida Highway Patrol trooper’s search of the defendant’s automobile, which yielded cocaine.
The officer properly stopped defendant’s automobile for speeding on Interstate 10. He was traveling 67 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. After he was pulled over, the defendant produced for the officer his driver’s license. The officer, who noticed that the defendant was very nervous, asked him where he was coming from. Defendant answered Pensacola. The officer asked the same question of the defendant’s female traveling companion, who replied Miami. The officer became suspicious and asked if he could “look about the vehicle,” pointing to the trunk of the vehicle, to which question the defendant said “yes.” At the officer’s request, the defendant then opened the trunk.1 While searching the trunk’s interior, the officer lifted a panel covering the fender well and found the cocaine. He then advised the defendant and his companion of the Miranda rights.
Appellant contends that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of a valid consent. We disagree. The state’s burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent by a preponderance of the evidence was clearly met. There was no antecedent police misconduct which would have presumptively tainted the subsequent consent. See State v. Blan, 489 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980).
Although the testimony indicated that the defendant was of Spanish descent and was conversant in Spanish, there was no evidence that the defendant had any difficulty communicating in English. In fact, the evidence was to the contrary. This serves to materially distinguish this case from our recent opinion in Acosta v. State, 519 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., and ERVIN, J., concur. . Appellant asserts that the officer searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle before requesting permission to search the trunk. However, the testimony does not show that the officer entered and conducted a search of the passenger compartment prior to the consent. Although not entirely clear, the testimony indicates that prior to the consent, the officer’s observations of the interior of the vehicle were from outside the vehicle.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Elsleger v. State, 503 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA), dismissed, 511 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1987); State v. Blan, 489 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). See also Rodriguez v. State, 519 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Acosta v. State, 519 So. 2d 658, 661 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). However, the issue in this case is not what standard of proof to apply in determining the voluntariness of the consent to search, but whether the consent is the resu…1 / 2
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Freeman v. State, 559 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…movements, we find that the investigatory stop herein was justified. Because the stop was not tainted by illegality, the state has only to show by a preponderance of the evidence that subsequent consent to search was voluntary. Rodriguez v. State, 519 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Here, the officer asked for, and was given, consent to search the appellant. There was nothing in the evidence from which it could be inferred that, prior to that consent, appellant was given the impression that search was inevi…
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State v. Chang, 668 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…was only required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Chang’s consent was voluntary. Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)); Rodriguez v. State, 519 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (the State’s burden in the absence of taint is preponderance of the evidence). There is no evidence in the record showing that Chang’s consent was anything but voluntary. See, e.g., Denehy, supra; Freeman v. State, 559 So. 2d 295…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Blan, 489 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Acosta v. State, 519 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)