BARBARA LLOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE ELLIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF NASSAU COUNTY, SAM HAYWARD, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS NASSAU COUNTY INVESTIGATOR, AND NASSAU COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-01-27
No. 87-29
BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
520 So. 2d 59 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Barbara Lloyd appealed the dismissal of her civil rights action against Nassau County Sheriff Lawrence Ellis and County Investigator Sam Hayward for false arrest and cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against them in their official capacities but reversed and remanded the dismissal of claims against them in their individual capacities, holding that notice requirements under Florida's waiver of immunity statute apply only to official-capacity suits, not individual-capacity suits.


Holding

The court held that § 1983 actions against state officials in their official capacities remain subject to sovereign immunity and are not subject to section 768.28 notice requirements, so dismissal of those claims was proper. However, the notice requirements of section 768.28(6) do not apply to claims against officials sued in their individual capacities, so dismissal of those claims was improper.


Headnotes

[1] A federal civil rights statute, such as 42 U.S.C.A. …

[2] Florida has not waived immunity from suit under federal civil rights statutes by enacting section 768.28.

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Key Quotes

“The federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1981), does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity in respect to actions under that statute against state agencies and officials; nor has the state of Florida waived immunity from suit under that federal statute by reason of the enactment of section 768.28.”

Establishes that § 1983 actions do not waive sovereign immunity and Florida has not waived such immunity through section 768.28

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Facts & Procedural History

Barbara Lloyd filed a civil rights action against Sheriff Lawrence Ellis and Investigator Sam Hayward, both individually and in their official capacit…

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Opinion of the Court
ZEHMER, Judge.

ZEHMER, Judge.

Appellant, Barbara Lloyd, appeals from orders granting Appellees Ellis and Hayward’s motions to dismiss her civil rights action. Lloyd sued Ellis and Hayward individually and in their official capacities as county sheriff and county investigator, respectively, for violation of her civil rights based on allegations of false arrest and cruel and unusual punishment.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lloyd failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Florida waiver of immunity statute, section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1985). This statute requires that, as a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action against the state or one of its agencies, notice must be given to the agency or subdivision involved and to the Department of Insurance a stated period of time prior to filing suit.

The federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1981), does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity in respect to actions under that statute against state agencies and officials; nor has the state of Florida waived immunity from suit under that federal statute by reason of the enactment of section 768.28. Spooner v. Department of Corrections, 514 So. 2d 1077 (Fla.1987); Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1987). See also, Gamble v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 779 F. 2d 1509 (11th Cir.1986). Since Appellant’s causes of action against both defendants in their official capacities are not subject to section 768.28, obviously the notice requirements in that statute are not applicable.

Nevertheless we affirm the dismissal of the section 1983 actions as to Appellees in their official capacities because it is now settled that such actions remain subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. Since other causes of action for false arrest, and so forth, against the Appellees in their official capacities could be maintained, if at all, under section 768.28, failure to comply with its notice requirements would bar any such cause of action should Appellant’s pro se complaint be subject to such construction.

Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Lloyd’s cause of action against Ellis and Hayward in their official capacities.

The notice requirements in section 768.28(6), however, are not applicable to Lloyd’s cause of action against Ellis and Hayward in their individual capacities. Hansen v. State, 503 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Lloyd’s causes of action against Ellis and Hayward in their individual capacities and remand for further proceedings on those causes of action.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • City OF Riviera Beach v. Langevin, 522 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
    …t of sovereign immunity. In our original decision, we expressed our concurrence with Southern Alliance Corporation v. City of Winter Haven, 505 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We reaffirm that concurrence here and hold that nothing in Lloyd v. Ellis, 520 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), nor in Chapman v. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 517 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), dissuades us. Our companion court, in Southern, relied upon two decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In the first…
  • Salazar v. Wille, 558 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …ounds. (1) The sheriff and his deputies, in their official capacity, are immune from suit. Hill v. Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 513 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1987); Howlett by Howlett v. Rose, 537 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Lloyd v. Ellis, 520 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). (2) The pleadings contain no allegations that the sheriff, in his individual capacity, personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of appellant’s decedent. Geter v. Wille, 846 F. 2d 1352 (11th Cir.1988);…
  • Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (U.S. 1990)
    …States need not establish courts competent to entertain § 1983 claims. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 3, n. 1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 283, n. 7 (1980). See Fla. Stat. § 26.012(2)(a) (1989). See, e. g., Lloyd v. Ellis, 520 So. 2d 59, 60 (App. 1st Dist. 1988); Skoblow v. Ameri-Manage, Inc., 483 So. 2d 809, 812 (App. 3d Dist. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, Spooner v. Department of Corrections, 514 So. 2d 1077 (1987); Chapman v. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., [*3…

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