JOSEPH D. HAVEARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-02-12
No. BR-455
SHIVERS, JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
520 So. 2d 636 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Joseph Haveard appealed the trial court's failure to credit 121 days of involuntary hospitalization at a state mental hospital under the Baker Act toward his concurrent prison sentences. The appellate court reversed, holding that recent Florida Supreme Court precedent (Tal-Mason v. State) required credit for preconviction coercive detention, and amended the sentences to include the 121-day credit.


Holding

Yes. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and amended the sentences to award credit for the 121 days of preconviction coercive confinement at the state hospital, applying the reasoning from Tal-Mason v. State.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in involuntary hospitalization pursuant to The Baker Act when that confinement is coercive and precedes conviction.

[2] Commitment for incompetence infringes upon significant liberty interests in a particularly coercive manner, warranting credit for preconviction detention.

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Key Quotes

“commitment for incompetence, unlike probationary rehabilitation, infringes upon significant liberty interests in a particularly coercive manner”

The Supreme Court's rationale in Tal-Mason for awarding jail-time credit for preconviction coercive detention

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Facts & Procedural History

Haveard was charged with various property offenses including theft, burglary, and forgery. On June 26, 1986, he was involuntarily hospitalized at Flor…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Joseph D. Haveard appeals an order of the trial court which failed to credit his concurrent sentences with 121 days spent in involuntary confinement at Florida State Hospital pursuant to The Baker Act. The only issue before this court is the failure to award credit for the period of involuntary hospitalization. We reverse.

Appellant was charged in five informa-tions with various property offenses, including theft, burglary, and forgery. Initially, appellant pled not guilty to all of the charges. By order dated June 26, 1986, appellant was involuntarily hospitalized for 121 days at Florida State Hospital, pursuant to The Baker Act. § 394.467, Fla.Stat. (1985).

On December 1,1986, appellant pled nolo contendere to several of the offenses, and the state nolle pressed the remaining charges pursuant to a plea agreement. On January 20, 1987, the trial court imposed concurrent 54r-month terms of imprisonment, to be followed by concurrent 15-year terms of probation. Appellant was credited with 176 days jail time, but received no credit for the 121 days of hospitalization pursuant to The Baker Act.

When the trial court entered the order granting jail time credit only, Florida law appeared to mandate denial of credit for time spent in the state hospital. See Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1981). Thereafter, on November 12, 1987, the supreme court’s opinion in Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987), distinguished Pennington on the basis of the petitioner’s probationary status, finding that “commitment for incompetence, unlike probationary rehabilitation, infringes upon significant liberty interests in a particularly coercive manner.” 515 So. 2d at 739. Accordingly, the court held that jail-time credit must be awarded for preconviction coercive detention.

By order dated January 22, 1988, this court directed the parties to file briefs addressing the possible applicability of the Tal-Mason opinion to the instant case. Both parties agree that Tal-Mason is applicable, and the state concedes that appellant is entitled to 121 days credit for the period of involuntary hospitalization. Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to expedite. We note that the state has authorized appellant’s counsel to represent that the Attorney General’s office will not oppose the motion to expedite.

Therefore, the sentences imposed are hereby amended to give credit for the 121 days preconviction coercive confinement. Upon receipt of this opinion, appellant’s counsel should notify the Department of Corrections as soon as possible, so that appellant’s release date may be calculated with application of the 121 days credit due.

Accordingly, the order awarding jail time credit is amended to reflect the addition of 121 days which were not formerly credited to appellant’s sentences.

SHIVERS, JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • David v. Hershel B. Meadows, 881 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …nt that a probationer cannot comply with the terms of probation”); Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987) (holding that defendant was entitled to credit for detention in a mental institution for incompetence to stand trial); Haveard v..State, 520 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the defendant was entitled to credit for the period of involuntary hospitalization). If, on the. other hand, Meadows is found in violation of the terms and conditions of release, the Commission has broad authority t…
  • Sanchez v. State, 949 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
    …trial or plea followed by sentencing, regardless of the statutory provision under which the person was committed ... [and regardless of its purpose].” (emphasis added). As support for his argument, Sanchez directs our attention to Haveard v. State, 520 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), in which the First District Court of Appeal, two years after Talr-Mason, applied Tal-Mason to award a defendant jail-credit for a pre-conviction, pre-trial period when he was involuntarily hospitalized under the Baker Act.2 Sanc…

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