CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Harris was sentenced above the guidelines based on habitual offender status, which was later deemed insufficient grounds. After remand, the trial court imposed another above-guidelines sentence with different reasons. The court reversed, holding that a trial court cannot enunciate new departure grounds after the original grounds have been reversed on appeal.
A trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by an appellate court. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing within the guidelines.
[1] A trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by an appellate court.
[2] A prior adjudication as a habitual offender is an insufficient ground for a departure sentence from sentencing guidelines.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by an appellate court.”
Establishes the core holding from Shull v. Dugger that trial courts are prohibited from creating new justifications for departure sentences after appellate reversal
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarris was sentenced in 1986 above the sentencing guidelines, with the sole justification being his adjudication as a habitual offender. The Florida S…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Habitual Offender Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
In 1986, Harris was sentenced in excess of the guidelines. The sole reason assigned for departure was that he had been adjudicated a habitual offender. Subsequently, Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986), determined that this was an insufficient ground. Accordingly, in Harris v. State, 499 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), we reversed
the enhancement beyond the sentencing guidelines pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986), and re-tum[ed] the matter to the trial court for resentencing.
On remand, the trial court again deviated upward from the guidelines, assigning three grounds1 to justify that action. Har ris has again appealed and we again reverse, this time on the authority of Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1987).2
Shull holds clearly that
a trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by an appellate court.
515 So. 2d at 750. Since the only ground assigned for the first departure was the legally insufficient one concerning Harris’s status as a habitual offender, Shull mandates the conclusion that no subsequent departure based on any other ground may be allowed to stand. The state argues that Shull should not have that effect in this case because reasons stated in the resentencing order were referred to, though not specifically adopted, in the first order. It is true that the initial order referred to Harris’s being found a habitual offender in another accompanying order which so adjudicated him and that two of the reasons3 upon which the resentencing was based were contained in that separate, “habitual offender” order. Nevertheless, we cannot read Shull’s repeated references to “the reasons for departure in the original order” to mean anything but the grounds actually assigned for the first departure. The habitual offender order quite obviously does not qualify. We do not think, as the state suggests, that it elevates form over substance to adhere to the strict admonition of the supreme court that new grounds for departure may not be seized upon after the ones first articulated are found insufficient.
Accordingly, we reverse the sentence under review and remand for resentencing within the guidelines.
. Harris does not challenge the sufficiency of these grounds as an original matter to support the departure.
. As in the case of Whitehead with respect to the first sentencing, Shull was decided after the second sentencing we now review.
. We note that at least one of the grounds was not contained even in the habitual offender order so that, in the absence of a finding which we need not make, that the departure would have occurred anyway, even an acceptance of the state’s position would result in no more than still another sentencing. See Mesa v. State, 520 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Robinson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…hat in Tyson v. State, 527 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), this court recently held that on resentencing a trial court may not rely on new reasons for departure, even where the initial grounds to depart were not in writing. See also Harris v. State, 520 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). However, here the defendant’s status as an incorrigible person who had not been rehabilitated despite prior imprisonment had been raised in the initial sentencing, and was not found invalid nor otherwise addressed in the first ap…
-
Velazguez-Velazguez v. State, 523 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…a.1986), holds that this ground is insufficient and the sentence is therefore reversed on that authority. Because it would be impermissible now to rely upon any other ground for deviation, Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1987); Harris v. State, 520 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), the cause is remanded for resentencing within the guidelines.…
-
Williams v. State, 545 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…e, 521 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (new reasons for upward departure sentence may not be enunciated where procedure flawed and reasons assigned insufficient; sentence vacated and cause remanded for resentencing within guidelines); Harris v. State, 520 So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) ("We cannot read Shull’s repeated references to ‘the reasons for departure in the original order’ to mean anything but the grounds actually assigned for the first departure. ... We do not think that it elevates form over subs…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986)
- Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Mesa, 520 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Cridland v. State, 499 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Harris v. State, 499 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)