KEVIN GARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a juvenile sentenced as an adult is subject to adult sentencing criteria, and the trial court did not err in its sentencing decisions.
A juvenile defendant was sentenced as an adult and appealed the sentence. The defendant argued the trial court erred in delegating sentencing order pr…
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LEHAN, Judge.
Defendant, a juvenile at the time of sentencing, appeals from his sentence, contending that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as an adult. We affirm.
We do not find merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court could not delegate to the prosecutor the task of writing the sentencing order pursuant to findings specifically made by the trial court. Carnegie v. State, 473 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), is clearly distinguishable. In that case the trial court had apparently given the prosecutor carte blanche authority to prepare the written reasons for departure.
We also do not find merit in defendant’s argument that defendant’s juvenile record of offenses committed within the previous three years should not have been scored because such scoring should only be permitted for adults. When a defendant is sentenced as an adult, he is subject to the criteria for adult sentencing. Similarly, we do not find merit in defendant’s argument that an appellate court has the authority to reverse, as too harsh, a sentence imposed within the guidelines recommended range upon a juvenile who is sentenced as an adult. Finally, we do not find merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to consider the criteria for sentencing a juvenile as an adult pursuant to section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). The record reflects that the trial court did consider those criteria, and, whether or not we would have applied each of those criteria as did the trial court, there was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
SCHEB, Acting C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Norris v. State, 674 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…s of property crimes committed during a single episode. However, the sentence imposed is within the guidelines range. Moreover, I am unable to conclude that the decision to impose adult sanctions was a clear abuse of discretion. E.g., Gard v. State, 521 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Wright v. State, 507 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accordingly, I concur.…
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City OF Oldsmar & Pamela Jo Bondi v. Trinh, 210 So. 3d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…plementing the TIEO’s decision to issue them. Accordingly, the completion of the tasks of preparing and mailing the notice and the UTC upon authorization by the TIEO does not constitute the unauthorized delegation of police power. Cf. Gard v. State, 521 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (rejecting the defendant’s argument “that the trial court could not delegate to the prosecutor the task of writing the sentencing order pursuant to findings specifically made by the trial court.”); Reid v. State, 673 So. 2d 9…
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- Carnegie v. State, 473 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)