STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
SUN CITY OIL COMPANY, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Fla. 5th DCA | 1988-03-17
No. 87-449
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
522 So. 2d 474 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of its 57-count information charging fuel tax violations, including embezzlement, grand theft, and RICO counts. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the RICO and grand theft counts, but properly required the State to prove criminal intent for embezzlement charges.


Holding

The court affirmed that section 206.56 requires proof of criminal intent and that the trial court erred in requiring embezzlement counts be reduced to a single count. The court reversed dismissal of the RICO and grand theft counts, holding that if the State elects to proceed under the grand theft statute, it may also prosecute under the RICO count since grand theft is a qualifying predicate crime, but the RICO count must be dismissed if the State elects to proceed under section 206.56 since embezzlement of fuel taxes is not a predicate crime under the RICO statute.


Headnotes

[1] A statute requiring proof of criminal intent for embezzlement of fuel taxes is correctly interpreted by a trial court.

[2] A trial court prematurely dismisses grand theft counts when a motion to elect between repugnant counts is made before the introduction of evidence.

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Key Quotes

“The State may charge a separate crime for each distinct month that monies are not reported and paid.”

Establishes that the State need not consolidate monthly violations into a single count

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Facts & Procedural History

Between May 1, 1983 and September 20, 1985, defendants allegedly failed to remit fuel taxes collected to the State. The State charged 57 counts: one R…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

The State appeals the dismissal of its 57 count information against the defendants, which charged that defendants had failed to remit to the State fuel taxes collected between May 1, 1983 and September 20, 1985.

With one exception, this case involves the identical legal issues presented in State v. H.M. Bowness Oil, Inc., 522 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The one difference is that in this case, unlike Bowness, the State added a count charging the defendants with engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, thus violating the Florida RICO Act, section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (1985).1 We reverse.

After charging the RICO violation in the first count, the State then charged 28 counts of embezzlement under section 206.-56, Florida Statutes (1983),2 one count for each month of non-payment, and for good measure, charged 28 counts of grand theft under the Omnibus Theft Statute, section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1983), for those same months.

On the authority of and for the reasons expressed in State v. H.M. Bowness Oil, Inc., supra, we conclude that: 1. The trial court correctly determined that section 206.56 requires proof of criminal intent.

2. Although the State cannot convict for both embezzlement under section 206.56 and theft under section 812.014 for the same taking, the trial court prematurely dismissed the counts based on the grand theft statutes, because the State cannot be required to elect between repugnant counts by a motion to dismiss. A motion to require the State to elect must be made before introduction of evidence by the defense.

3. The trial court erred in requiring the State to charge all the alleged embezzlement under section 206.56 in one count. The State may charge a separate crime for each distinct month that monies are not reported and paid.

Bowness did not involve, thus did not discuss, the RICO count, which is charged here. We conclude that if the State elects to proceed under the grand theft statute, it may also prosecute under the RICO count, because grand theft is one of the predicate crimes on which a RICO violation may be based. On the other hand, if it elects to proceed under section 206.56, the RICO count should then be dismissed because a violation of that statute is not one of the predicate crimes listed in section 895.02. That this omission was intended by the legislature and was not an oversight is indicated by the fact that violation of the statute relating to evasion of payment of cigarette taxes is listed as a predicate crime. Had the legislature intended to include evasion of payment of fuel taxes in the long list of predicate crimes, it would have said so. We reject appellees’ contention that they may not be prosecuted for the underlying predicate acts in addition to the RICO violation. See Carroll v. State, 459 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

Summarizing, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the counts charging embezzlement of fuel taxes, with leave to amend to allege the requisite criminal intent, and we reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the counts charging the RICO violation and grand theft. We also reverse the trial court’s determination that the embezzlement counts must be reduced to a single count. The cross-appeal is dismissed. Bowness, supra.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . This statute provides:

(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.

. This statute provides:

Failure to account for tax collected; embezzlement. — If any distributor collects from another, upon an invoice rendered, the tax in this part contemplated, and fails to report and pay the same to the department as provided, he shall be deemed to be guilty of embezzlement of funds, the property of the state, and upon conviction shall be punished as if convicted of larceny of a like sum.

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Citator

Cited By

  • Bradenton Grp., Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 701 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …s attempted to bootstrap bingo offenses into lottery offenses in order to create a RICO violation. They urge that the courts should not be receptive to artful pleading when establishing RICO predicate acts of racketeering. State v. Sun City Oil Co., 522 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and State v. Kessler, 626 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 627 (Fla.1994). However contrived the state’s theory, it either succeeds or fails on the question whether any of the allegations of illegal activ…
  • St. Elmo Cash, Jr. v. State, 609 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …Laws of Florida. The state cites to the decisions of the Fifth District in State v. H.M. Bowness Oil, Inc., 522 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), receded from on other grounds, State v. McAdams, 559 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1990), and State v. Sun City Oil Co., 522 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), as authority that the state may, at its election, prosecute Cash either for embezzlement under section 206.56 or for grand theft under section 812.014. Cash’s supplemental reply brief argues that the language of section 206.41…
    1 / 2

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