PEEPLES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
ESCOE GREEN, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-03-17
No. BT-100
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
522 So. 2d 493 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Peeples Construction appeals a jury verdict awarding Escoe Green $14,833.32 for breach of contract. The court reverses, finding that the subcontract's language requiring work "as shown and called for on the plans and specifications" unambiguously required permanent asphalt patching, not merely temporary repair, making extraneous evidence inadmissible.


Holding

The court held that the subcontract, incorporating the project plans and specifications, is unambiguous as a matter of law and clearly requires permanent asphalt repair. Therefore, the trial judge erred in admitting extraneous evidence and testimony regarding the parties' prior proposal and trade usage, and judgment should be entered in favor of Peeples Construction.


Headnotes

[1] A written subcontract that incorporates by reference external plans and specifications is not rendered ambiguous by the existence of a prior proposal that contains differ…

[2] Extraneous evidence and testimony regarding contract formation are inadmissible when the terms of a written contract, including incorporated documents, are clear and unam…

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Key Quotes

“The terms of the subcontract, including the incorporated plans and specifications of the project, which are contained in the record (especially as depicted on the paving repair details at Sheet C-4 of the plans), are not ambiguous as a matter of law. They show that permanent asphalt repair was contemplated by the subcontract and agreed to by the parties.”

Establishes the court's holding that the contract language is unambiguous and requires permanent patching.

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Facts & Procedural History

Peeples Construction and Escoe Green entered into a $93,000 subcontract for utility work including water and sewer installation. The dispute concerned…

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Opinion of the Court
WIGGINTON, Judge.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Appellant appeals a final order, entered after jury verdict, awarding appellee a money judgment in the amount of $14,-833.32.

We reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of appellant. The cause concerns a $93,000 subcontract entered into by appellant and appellee (a utility contractor) requiring appellee to install a water servicing and sewer system for the construction of a storage facility. The parties’ dispute arose over the manner in which appellee patched certain pavement in completion of its work under the subcontract. Appellee’s position was that, under the contract, it was required merely to apply a temporary patch in the asphalt.

Appellant maintained that the wording in the contract and the clear meaning of the term “cutting and patching pavement” in the industry dictate that appellee was responsible for permanently patching the pavement in question and that, by applying only a temporary patch, appellee failed to fulfill its contractual obligation. On that ground, appellant withheld from appellee partial payment under the contract. Thereupon, appellee asserted the instant claim that appellant had breached the contract by failing to pay all sums due thereunder, and the jury entered a verdict in appellee’s favor. The basis of appellee’s assertion is its “proposal” to appellant dated April 16, 1984, wherein it provided that it would furnish all labor and materials and temporary asphalt repair. On the following day, appellee, through its agent, Mr.

S. Greer Wells, entered into the subcontract with appellant. That agreement did not include the above language but provides that the work performed by appellee is to be completed in accordance with the plans and specifications of the overall (Jacksonville Port Authority) project. In specific regard to cutting and patching pavement, the subcontract provided:

Note: Cutting & Patching Pavement all as shown and called for on the plans and described in the specifications, including addenda thereto, if any, all of which SubContractor hereby acknowledges that he has read and is familiar with, entitled JPA Project No. C-297, Equipment Storage Facility, Blount Island Marine Terminal. ...

At trial, after determining that the phrase “cutting and patching” as used in the subcontract is ambiguous, the trial judge allowed appellee to present testimony that, in appellee’s understanding, the contract did not contemplate that appellee would permanently patch the pavement. He also allowed appellee to introduce into evidence its written proposal, submitted prior to the signing of the contract, declaring that appellee’s bid included only temporary asphalt repair. Both parties presented witnesses who testified on the question of whether the term “cutting and patching” has any trade usage meaning in the industry.

Appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in admitting the above evidence and testimony when a clear and unambiguous contract exists which contains the parties’ entire agreement.

We agree. The terms of the subcontract, including the incorporated plans and specifications of the project, which are contained in the record (especially as depicted on the paving repair details at Sheet C-4 of the plans), are not ambiguous as a matter of law. They show that permanent asphalt repair was contemplated by the subcontract and agreed to by the parties.

Thus, the trial judge erred in admitting extraneous evidence and testimony relating to the formation of the contract.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of appellant. See Nevel v. Monteleone, 514 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Terex Trailer Corp. v. McILWAIN, 579 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …p., 140 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 377 (Fla.1962). Where the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous, the court cannot give it any meaning beyond that expressed. Peeples Construction Co. v. Escoe Green, Inc., 522 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Bay Management, Inc. v. Beau Monde, Inc., 366 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The parties’ intention will be determined first from the language used, second, from the apparent objects to be accomplished, other provisions in the a…
  • James A. Cummings, Inc. v. Young, 589 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …ce with the landscaping plans. Cummings asserts that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence when a clear and unambiguous contract exists which contains the parties’ entire agreement. We agree. See Peeples Constr. Co. v. Escoe Green, Inc., 522 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The only issue the trial court should have considered was whether the architect ruled on the issue as required by Article VIII of the contract. The law on this issue is best summarized in material part in 2 Construction and Des…

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