STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RANDY LEON GRIMMAGE, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of burglary, grand theft, and felonious possession of a firearm charges against Grimmage. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court prematurely dismissed the charges and that a presumption of knowledge that property was stolen could apply despite a five-day gap between theft and sale.
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges. The five-day period between theft and sale was not too long to support the statutory presumption that Grimmage knew or should have known the property was stolen, and the reasonableness of his explanation should be determined by a jury, not the trial court. Venue for the firearm charge could lie in the county where the gun was stolen if a jury found it was stolen there.
[1] The presumption of knowledge of stolen property under section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, is applicable even when possession of the property occurs several days after t…
[2] A defendant's explanation for possession of recently stolen property must be patently reasonable and totally unrefuted to warrant a directed judgment of acquittal when th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where a defendant gives a patently reasonable explanation of his possession of recently stolen goods which is totally unrefuted, and there is no other evidence of guilt, the court must direct a judgment of acquittal. If, on the other hand, the explanation is only arguably reasonable or if there is any evidence which places it in doubt, the court should permit the jury to make the decision.”
Establishes the standard for when a trial court should dismiss theft charges versus allowing jury determination of credibility and reasonableness of defendant's explanation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrimmage sold a stolen firearm to a pawn shop five days after it was reported stolen from a home located 0.15 miles from his residence. He sold the gu…
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FRANK, Judge.
The appellee, Grimmage, was charged with burglary of a dwelling, grand theft and, subsequently, with felonious possession of a firearm. He pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss both cases; the state demurred. Following a hearing the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We reverse.
In his motion to dismiss Grimmage admitted that he sold a gun to a pawn shop five days after the gun had been reported stolen from a home located .15 miles from his home. The sale price was considerably less than the gun’s market value. He ex plained that he had received the gun from an unidentified person and denied committing the burglary.
The state announced its intention to rely upon the presumption provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985), that an individual in possession of recently stolen property, without a satisfactory explanation, knew or should have known that the property was stolen. This presumption, standing alone, has been held sufficient to support a theft conviction. Coleman v. State, 466 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Morgan v. State, 303 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Burroughs v. State, 221 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Here, however, the trial court dismissed the information based upon an erroneous impression that the five-day period was too long to support the presumption.
In Burroughs we rejected a contention that six weeks between the theft and discovery of a stolen automobile was too long to permit reliance upon the presumption that the defendant knew the property was stolen. We emphasized in that instance that the nature and identity of the property were important considerations, as is the defendant's explanation for his possession of the property. Our observation in Coleman was:
As we see it, the rule is that where a defendant gives a patently reasonable explanation of his possession of recently stolen goods which is totally unrefuted, and there is no other evidence of guilt, the court must direct a judgment of acquittal. If, on the other hand, the explanation is only arguably reasonable or if there is any evidence which places it in doubt, the court should permit the jury to make the decision.
466 So. 2d at 397.
Only after factual inquiry will the propriety of the application of section 812.022(2) to this case be apparent. The trial court acted prematurely in dismissing the theft and burglary charges.
Finally, because Grimmage admitted that he possessed the firearm when he sold it in Hillsborough County and not in Pinellas County, where the information was initiated, the trial court dismissed the charge of felonious possession of a firearm on venue grounds. A jury could reasonably conclude, however, that if the defendant had stolen the gun in Pinellas County he also feloniously possessed it there, with the result that venue would lie in Pinellas County.
The order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss is reversed, and this cause is remanded with direction for the trial court to reinstate the information.
RYDER, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Citator
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Jackson v. State, 736 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…the finder of fact must also determine whether the property at issue was “recently” stolen, a finding which is necessary for the inference of guilty knowledge to be justified. See S.B. v. State, 555 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Grimmage, 522 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (involving five days between theft and recovery); N.C. v. State, 478 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Burroughs v. State, 221 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). The state’s argument is based on the McDonald line of cases. Ill Over t…
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Guerrero v. State, 532 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…he court’s instruction on this inference prompted the jury to infer that the defendant knew or should have known that the property was stolen, and virtually directed the jury to- convict. State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1968); State v. Grimmage, 522 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The court even reread the instruction at the jury’s request. The repeated emphasis on defendant’s unexplained possession of the car precludes a finding that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. See Ciccarell…
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Yudin v. State, 117 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…y”). . This patently reasonable/arguably reasonable distinction has been followed by this court in subsequent cases. See Wilson v. State, 884 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Hau-gabrook v. State, 827 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); State v. Grimmage, 522 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). . Cavanaugh testified that he was not at home when first contacted by Costa. He said that his grandson, who was at the home with some others doing some remodeling work, called the police when a suspicious car drove up to the hou…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Coleman v. State, 466 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Burroughs v. State, 221 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Morgan v. State, 303 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)